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THE RIGHTS OF MAN IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS
VERSUS RATIONAL ACTION
MYRts S. McDOUGAL* AND GERTRUDE C. K. LEIGHTONf
"It was a great day for the human race . . .when the idea dawned that every man
is a human being, an end in himself, with a claim for the development of his own per-
sonality, and that human beings had a dignity and a worth, respect for which is the
firm basis of human association."
CrAaRES E. MERRIAM, SYsEAIvi-asic POLITICS 59 (1945)"
"The Independence of America, considered merely as a separation from England,
would have been a matter of but little importance, had it not been accompanied by a
Revolution in the principles and practices of Governments. She made a stand, not for
herself only, but for the world, and looked beyond the advantages herself could receive."
TiHOMS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 151 (1792) (Everyman's ed.)
It is only from a perspectiv6 of centuries that the United Nations program for
"human rights" can be accurately observed or rationally appraised. This program,
too often thought to be at the periphery of the purposes of the United Nations,
represents in fact the main core of rational objectives not only of the United Na-
tions but of all democratic government.1 It represents the converging and integra-
tion on a global scale of many movements, movements hitherto restricted in areal
diffusion but centuries-old and rooted deep in universal human nature and civilized
culture.2 It is heir to all the great historic democratic movements-for constitution-
alism, freedom, equality, fraternity, humanitarianism, liberalism, enlightenment,
peace, opportunity, and so on It is the contemporary culmination of man's long
struggle for all his basic human values:
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'CARL L. BECKER, MODERN DEMOCRACY (1941); CHARLES E. MERRIAt, SYSTEMtATIC POLITICS e. 2
(944).
To SECURE THESE RIGrs, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS'S COMMIMTEE ON CIVIL RtoInTs (1947)
appropriately has for its frontispiece the words from the Declaration of Independence: ". . . to secure
these rights governments are instituted among men .. " Cf. Jefferson to Madison: "A bill of rights is
what the people are entitled to against -every government on earth, general or particular; and what no
just government should refuse or rest on inferences." 4 WiRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 477 (Ford ed.
1894).
'BRONISLAW MALINowsKi, FREEDOM AND CIVILIZATION (1944); GARDNER MURPHY (ED.), HuMAtr
NATURE AND ENDtRINO PEACE (1945); GARDNER MURPHY, PERSONALITY 905 et scq. (1947).
'HERSH LAUTERPAcH, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHrs oF MAN 3-65 (1945), and PRELI7,-
NARY REPORT To INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, BRUSSELS CONFERENCE (1948): A. N. HOLCotNMw
HUMAN RIGrrs SN THE MODERN WORLD C. 2 (1948); Acton, Freedom in Antiquity in HISTORY oi FREE-
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for participation in the processes by which he is governed, equality before the law,
and that wide sharing of power, both formal and real, which we call democracy;
for sanctity of person, for freedom from arbitrary restraints and cruel and inhuman
punishments, and for positive opportunity to develop latent talents for the enrichment
and well-being of personality;
for the enlightenment by which rational decisions can be made and for freedom of
inquiry and opinion;
for that fundamental respect for human dignity which both precludes discrimination
based on race, sex, color, religion, political opinion, or other ground irrelevant to capacity
and provides positive recognition of common merit as a human being and special merit
as an individual;
for access to resources to produce the goods and services necessary to maintain rising
standards of living and comfort;
for acquisition of the skills necessary to express talent and to achieve individual and
community values to the fullest;
for freedom to explain life, the universe, and values, to fix standards of rectitude, and
to worship God or gods as may seem best;
for affection, fraternity, and congenial personal relationships in groups freely chosen;
for, in sum, a security which includes not only freedom from violence and threats
of violence but also full opportunity to preserve and increase all values by peaceful,
noncoercive procedures.4
It is for values such as these that men have always framed constitutions, estab-
lished governments, and sought that delicate balancing of power and formulation
of fundamental principle necessary to preserve human rights against all possible
aggressors, governmental and other.5  The United Nations taken as a whole-
Charter, organization and practice-is but man's latest effort, though with a
grander vision and on a more comprehensive scale than ever before. It is com-
monly agreed, as the Charter states,6 that the principal purpose for which the
United Nations was established is the maintenance of "international peace and
security." Throughout the Charter, however, runs the wise recognition, which per-
vaded all the great declarations of war aims and general consciousness of mankind,
that peace and security, even in the limited sense of freedom from physical violence,
cannot be obtained by arbitrary fiat and sheer balancing of power.7 A peace to
DOM AND OTHER EssAYs (Figgis and Lawrence Eds. 1922); GEORO TELLINEK, THE DECLARATION OF TH
RIGrrs O MAN AND OF CrnzENs; A CONTRBUaION TO MODERN CONSTITIUTIONAL HISTORY (Farrand Tr.
19o0); FERNANDO, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIoHs (1948); Laski, Democracy, 5 ENCYC. Soc.
Sci. 76 (1931); Shephard, Government, 7 id. at 8 (1932); Brinton, Equality, 5 id. at 574 (193i);
Ruggiero, Liberalism, 9 id. at 435 (1933); THOMAS V. SMITH, THE PROMISE OF AmERICAN POLITICS (1936);
GEORGE E. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITImA. THEORY (1937); JoHN L. R.NDALL, THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN MIND (rev. ed. 1940).
" For the utility in systematic analysis of this particular categorization of values, see HAROLD D. LASS-
WELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1948); Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy;
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203, 217 (1943); McDougal, The Role of Law
in World Politics, 2o Miss. L. J. 253 (i949).
'CHARLES H. MCILWAIN, CoNsTiTuTioNALIsI: ANCIENT AND MODERN (rev. ed. 1947), and CONSTIru-
TIONALISM AND THE CHANGING WORLD (939); Hamilton, Constitutionalism, 4 ENCYC. SoC. SCI. 255
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' CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Preamble and Article I (Dep't State Pub. No. 2353, Conference
Series 74, 1945).
'LELAND M. GOODRICH AND EDVARD HAMIBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 93, 319 (2d and rev. ed. 1949).
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endure must include the conditions of peace and a reduction of the severe frustra-
tions that drive men to violence.' Some deprivations and threats of external dic-
tation men find more intolerable than war. Peace as the common man conceives
it includes more than freedom from war and threats of war: it includes the freedom,
without external dictation from any arbitrary power, to maintain and enhance
by peaceful, non-coercive procedures the value positions both of himself and of all
others with whom he identifies.0 Hence the United Nations Charter insists upon
a peace "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law," states
among its major purposes the achievement of "international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or. religion,"'10 and
both imposes a definite legal obligation upon its member states to promote this
objective and establishes a machinery of its own to take further measures.
The intensification within recent centuries, most notably since the industrial
revolution, of the demands of the individual human being for security in the full
sense indicated above, for the greater production and sharing of all values, and
especially for respect, in the sense both of equality of access to all values and of
symbolic recognition of this equality, is a matter of common observation.'1 The basic
trend in demand and community response has been well characterized as the
"fundamental democratization of society."'" The evidences of a major movement
from caste society to free society are written large in both doctrine and practice.
All of the great post-feudal philosophies, from liberal capitalist through socialist
and excluding only the totalitarian, have stressed the fundamental dignity of the
individual human being and demanded its realization in practice. Stimulated by
modern science and technology and by a growing uniformity in world attention
and attitudes, practice has responded in recent generations with wholesale liquida-
tion of discriminations based on caste exclusions and in a great rise in community
activities designed to provide individuals with any necessary compensating assist-
ance required to raise them to minimum levels and to afford positive opportunities
for maturing latent talents into socially valued expression. One could point to such
' GARDNER MURPHY (ED.), HUECAN NATURE AND ENDURING PEACE 29 (1945): ". . . the risk of war
is so great that the over-all strategy of peace calls for the reduction of severe frustrations rather than
the futile effort to extirpate aggression by fiat, discipline, or punishment."
'The latest authoritative reaffirmation of this conception appears in the preamble of the North
Atlantic Security Pact, which reads that the "parties to this treaty" are "determined to safeguard the
freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law." (Dep't State Pub. No. 3464, General Foreign Policy Series 8,
1949).
o U. N. CHARER Art. i.
" For systematic review see Lasswell, The Interrelations of World Organization and Society, 55 YALE
L. J. 889 (1946). See also RICHARD H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY (1931); ERIC J. DINOWELL, RACIAL PRIDE
AND PRE7UDICE (946); HAROLD F. GOSNELL, DEMOCRACY: THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM (1948); Louis
LE FEvRE, LIBERTY AND RESTAINT (1931); FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, INTERNATIONAL POLInCS 540 (4th
ed. r948); z QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 170 (1942).
"
5
KARL MANNHEIM, MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN ACE OF RECONSTRUCTION 44 (x940).
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items as the extension of suffrage and improvement in representation techniques;
the creation of a free school system and the expansion of facilities for communication;
protections against arbitrary restraint and the amelioration of punishment; pro-
vision of respected jobs at minimum wages and shorter hours of work; conscious
community planning of resource use and development; provision of better housing
and proper medical care; unemployment programs and employment and health
insurance; social security; improvement of facilities for recreation; and many more.
With the new stimulus of promise and threat in the development of atomic energy,
it is not to be expected that common men the world around will reduce their
demands. Short of world tyranny and intimidation, it can, on the contrary, be
safely predicted that they will both increase and still further intensify their demands.
It is a commonplace in a world threatened by new war and atomic destruction
that all peoples everywhere are today interdependent for securing all their basic
demands, that mankind today lives in what is in fact a world community. It is
a familiar history, often recounted, how many changes-changes in population;
changes in the attitudes, identifications, and expectations of people; changes in
techniques of organization and institutional practices; and most important of all,
changes in technology, the railroad, steamship, and airplane, the press and tele-
communications, and now atomic energy-have transformed the world from
relatively independent, discrete localities into a congeries of interacting regional
communities and a single world community. 8 It may, however, be conducive to
clarity to mark out the main outlines of peoples' interdependences with respect
to security and all the other values which we sum up as "human rights." The most
decisive value process in the world community is the world power process in which
the nation-state is still the predominant participant. How power is structured in-
ternally in a nation-state, how the individual human being is related to centrally
organized coercion, affects very directly how that nation-state seeks to exercise
power in the world arena, whether by violence or peaceful procedures. It has been
observed that the Nazi leaders rose to power by the systematic suppression of civil
liberties at home; 4 the violence they brought to the world arena still sears mankind.
" RALPH B. PERRY, ONE WoRu IN THE MAKING (1945) ("Dedicated to the Memory of Wendell
Willkie the First Prviate Citizen of that One World Which Having Discovered for Himself He Dis-
closed to His Fellow-Americans"); Wright, Accomplishments and Expectations of World Organization,
55 YALE L. J. 870 (1946); QuINCY WRIGHT (ED.), THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1948); MANNHEIM, Op. cit.
supra note 12, at 49; EMERY REvas, THE ANATOMY OF PEACE (1945); CORD MEYER, PEACE OR ANARCHY
(1945); WILLIAM L. BORDEN, THERE WILL BE No TIME (946); UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, FOUNDATIONS
FOR WORLD ORDER (949); WILLIAM F. OGBURN (ED.), TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(949); HANS W. WEIGERT, VLHJALMAUR STEFANSSON AND RICHARD E. HARRISON (EDs.), NEW COMPASS
oi mH WORLD (1949); LymtN BRYSON, Louis FINKLESTEIN, AND ROBERT M. MAcIvEia (EDs.), APPROACHES
TO WORLD PEACE (1944); RALPH LINTON (ED.), MosT OF mE WORtLD (1949); Murdock, Knauth, and
Thayer, Law and Lawyers for One World in the Making, 16 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 97 (1948).
14 3 SIDNEY POST SImPsoN AND JULIUS STONE, CASES AND READINGS ON LAW AND SOCIETY 1595 (1949):
"Historically German Fascism rose to power by deliberately destroying the liberties achieved under
German democracy . . ." A graphic account of the internal deprivation of human rights and of its
connection vith preparation for external aggressions appears in the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
In Effects of International Tension on Liberty Under Law, 48 COL. L. REv. 555, 558 (948), Fritz
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History too recent makes it clear that elites who come to power and maintain in-
ternal rule by violence are prone to regard violence as the principal instrument of
international change; in complement, their intimidated masses are all too ready
to turn their forcibly repressed and accumulated hatreds against their fellow men,
across some arbitrary boundary line. 5 Conversely, the respect for individual hu-
man dignity which even a democratic nation-state can maintain is in large
measure a function of that state's position in a total world context. When expecta-
tions of violence and war are high, the requirements of self-preservation may move
even the best-intentioned toward a "garrison-prison" state.'0 In the age of the
shattered atom and rumored bacteriological horrors, when all nation-states are so
obsessed by expectations of impending violence that they must calculate every
proposed measure of cooperation about wealth, enlightenment, or human rights
generally in terms of possible effects on fighting power, it takes no great insight
to know that no people can be secure unless all people are secure and possess all
the conditions of security.
Interdependences comparable to the kind outlined for the world power process
could be indicated for every other world value process. Documentation could be
offered both territorially, with respect to each value around the globe, and function-
ally, as between all values.17  A few suggestions must suffice. Thus, with respect
to wealth, just as measures for economic improvement must be assayed in terms
Morstein Marx generalizes: "As a political system dedicated to the categorical imperatives of a secular
religion, totalitarianism is essentially expansionist. It is missionary in spirit and messianic in aspirations."
He develops the theme in Totalitarian Politics, 82 PROc. Am!. PHIL. Soc. s (1940).
"In a chapter on The Emotional Structure of Totalitarianism in his Out AoE oF UNREASONJ (1942),
Franz Alexander offers profound analysis of the relevant psychological factors. He summarizes:
"A peculiarly vicious circle in socio-dynamics can be observed here. An authoritarian
state is created which deprives its citizens of self-expression in the interests of economic
competition with other nations. This injury to self-esteem requires aggressive action and war
becomes an inevitable compensation. Diplomatic victories achieved by compromise no longer
suffice, for the heroic life of conquest and domination for their own sake and the myth
of the superior race are incompatible with anything but martial victory. In order to
make some compensation to those who have lost their normal means of self-expression, the
ideology of the victorious super race was invented. This was an appeal to the destructive
emotional forces in human nature, especially hate, which had been simmering for years
in an impoverished and over-disciplined people who had been forced to sacrifice butter
for guns, individual expression for cringing subordination, self-esteem for awe, and
conscience for blind obedience. This hate was generated in the barracks under the sadistic
drill of the sergeants, in the factories by the abolition of recently acquired political rights,
in a demoralized middle-class which had sunk to the level of the proletariat and needed
someone to look down upon as inferior. The awakened Frankenstein's monster of hate
must move against the rest of humanity to save the Ffihrer and his small camarilla from
destruction. Hate once mobilized knows no barriers and cares little who are its victims.
If an object is lacking, it may even react against the hater himself and occasion suicide."
16 Lasswell, supra note i.
In a speech at Monticello on July 4, 1947, President Truman stated: "So long as the basic rights of
man are denied in any substantial portion of the earth, men everywhere must live in fear of their
own rights and their own security." 17 DEP'T STrATE BULL. 8o, 81 (1947).
For more detailed discussion of the interdependences of human rights and security, see Wright, The
Rights of Man, 3 U. N. W'EEKLY BULL. 777 (1947).
"
1For development of the interdependences here sketched see McDougal, supra note 4.
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of their effects on power, so also because of the demands of people a rising stand-
ard of living everywhere is indispensable to security; and, further, because the
economic cycle is now world-wide in its impact, depression in any significant area
of the world makes it correspondingly difficult in all other areas to maintain high
levels in the production and sharing of goods and, hence, the conditions under
which liberty and human personality can flourish. Similarly, with respect to en-
lightenment, accurate knowledge of other peoples' attitudes, identifications, and
expectations and a clear understanding of world-wide interdependences are in-
dispensable to rational decisions about security and other values. Yet in a world
increasingly divided and marked off by iron curtains, it is increasingly difficult for
the free peoples of the world to acquire and spread the enlightenment necessary for
rational decision. Finally, coming explicitly to the value respect itself, recent
scientific studies confirm the common-sense notion that the degree to which men
are treated with simple human dignity affects their every response, predisposing
them either to violence, war, and revolution or to their utmost exertion in the
peaceful production of values."" One of the major factors in world politics today,
affecting all decisions, is the accumulated resentment of countless millions of
people, and even whole nations, arising from long endured discriminations, depriva-
tions, and humiliations-a resentment capable of being discharged against many
targets, internal and external. 9 It may be recalled also that aggression, brutality,
and violations of human dignity, such as devised by the Nazis, are as contagious as
germs; models of disrespect for human dignity anywhere in the world can be
copied everywhere. It is not too much, therefore, to summarize that because of
man's deep, rising demands for consideration and because of all these interde-
pendences, a world half-slave and half-free cannot endure2 0
"' The classic work for basic principles and history of opinion is JOHN DOLLARD, FRUSTRATION AND
AGGRESSION (1939). Among the more important experimental studies of the fundamental significance of
the respect factor are those conducted and inspired by Elton Mayo. For detailed references see E.TON
MAYO, THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION (1945), AND FRITZ J. RoET'rHLSBERGER,
MANAGEMENT AND MORALE (941).
For general background see Sharp, Aggression, 57 ETnes 1 (1947); CHiSHOLm, The Psychiatry of
Enduring Peace, 6 PSYCHIATRY 3 (946); Cook, Democratic Psychology and. a Democratic World Order,
I WOLD PoLITICS 553 (1949); EDWARD GLOVER, WAR, SADIsM, AND PACIFISM (933); RANYA.RD WEST,
PSYCHOLOGY AND WORLD ORDER (1945), and CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY (x945); Lasswell, supra note 4;
ERICH FROtmm, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941); JOHN C. FLilGEL, MAN, MORALS AND SOCIETY (1945);
HARRY S. SULLIVAN, CONCEPTIONS OF MODERN PSYCHIATRY (947); ABRAM KARDINER, THE PSYCHOLOGfICAL
FRONTIERS OF SOCIETY (945); II PRdC. INT. CONF. ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY (948), for a series of papers
on aggression.
" ROBERT M. MACIVER (ED.), CIVILIZATION AND GROUP RELATIONsHIPS 40 (1945). ALEXANDER,
op. ct. supra note 15, at ",i: "When the organism is frustrated in the gratification of any of its basic
needs, agressive behavior is the most common response. This is fundamentally an attempt to obtain the
necessities of life by force."
See also DINOWALL, op. ct. supra note ii; HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITs AND PERSONAL
INSECURITY, c. 5, Independence Movements. The Demand for Equality (1935); RUTH F. BENEDICT, RACE:
SCIENCE AND POLITICs (1943); ROBERT M. MACIVER, THE MORE PERFECT UNION (1948); GUNNAR MYanAL,
THE AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944); OLIVER C. COX, CAr, CLASS, AND RACE (1948), with an introduction
by Roucek: "Nothing has been more provocative of international ill will than problems springing from,
and directly and indirectly related to, the phenomena of caste, class and race." Id. at xxvii.
" Lewis and Ellingston, introduction to Symposium on Essential Human Rights, 243 ANNALS (1946):
"A world society possessed of limitless destructive power on wings must be organized to save the welfare
and freedom of the individual human being or it will destroy itself."
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II
It is in the context of these demands and interdependences that the United
Nations program for human rights was conceived and is being implemented. The
structure of obligation assumed in the Charter embraces seven specific references to
human rights. As in no like international treaty the "people," not the signatory
states, of the United Nations reaffirm their "faith ...in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in equal rights of men and women. . "..." The Purposes
and Principles, already referred to,22 which have general application to the organiza-
tion are particularized in the obligation of the General Assembly to initiate studies
and make recommendations for the purpose of "promoting international co-
operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and
assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.' '2a This undertaking is
reiterated in Article 55 of Chapter IX, which concerns international economic and
social cooperation. The obligation which looks to "the creation of conditions of
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations" binds both the General Assembly and the Economic and Social
Council 24 in clearly mandatory language25 to promoting "universal respect for, and
obseruance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion."' Like the General Assembly, the Economic
and Social Council is also empowered to make recommendations to promote respect
and "observance of" human rights,2" and to establish commissions for their pro-
motion 8 The "basic objectives" of the trusteeship system is to "encourage respect
for human rights" (and also to encourage, it should be noted, "recognition of the
interdependence of the peoples of the world.") 29  Not only are the various organs
of the United Nations thus heavily obligated to satisfy demands for human rights, but
the member states signatory to the Charter directly bind themselves. Article 56
provides "[A]ll members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
" U. N. CHARTER, Preamble, supra note 6.
" See supra note io.
5 3 U. N. CHArTaR Art. 13 (x)(b).
Id. Art. 6o. "Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this
Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in
the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X."
"
5Id. Art. 55: ". . . The United Nations shall promote . . ." (Italics supplied.)
"
6 Id. Art. 55. This Article along with Articles 13 and 62 was enlarged in the course of the San
Francisco Conference to include a broader emphasis on human rights than had originally been the case
in the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. See It DEP'r STA BULL. 368; REPORT To THE
PRESIDENT Or; THE REsuLTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, Hearings before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 53, 102, 105, 1o8, 12-20 (x945).
The italicized words were added "to strengthen the statement by making it clear that something
more than formal respect for the rights and freedoms in question is demanded." GOOoRIeCH AND HAMNIRO,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 322.
21 U. N. CHARTER Art. 62.
"I1d. Art. 68. The Commission on Human Rights is one of the few commissions expressly authorized
by the Charter.21 Id. Art. 76.
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cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55." These purposes it will be recalled include promoting "observance of"
as well as general respect for human rights.
The execution of this program finds partial expression in the Genocide Conven-
tion," the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 ' the currently proposed Inter-
national Covenant of Human Rights, ' and in various suggested measures for imple-
mentation and enforcement 3  The Genocide Convention and the Declaration of
Human Rights, the one a treaty to be ratified, the other a declaration of policy and
public affirmation addressed to member states, were approved by the General As-
sembly in December, I948"a The Convention seeks to eradicate the ultimate de-
privation of human rights: the destruction of national, ethnical, racial, or religious
groups "as such.""5 Inspired by frightful Nazi precedents, not only is killing mem-
bers of a group on racial or other grounds prohibited but also the imposition of
destructive conditions of life, the prevention of births, and other measures directed
toward group extermination are banned3 6 The scope of the Convention extends to
public officials and rulers, as well as to private individuals," all of whom may in
addition to the crime of genocide be indicted for conspiracy, attempt, and complicity
in respect to genocide, and for "incitement" of the crime38 Enforcement involves
the undertaking by signatories to incorporate this newly devised international crime
into domestic lav,' and to submit disputes as to interpretation, application, or ful-
fillment to the International Court of Justice. 0 Other organs of the United Nations
-the General Assembly, the Security Council-may be called upon to consider
action for prevention or suppression of the crime.4 And it is contemplated that
upon the establishment of an international penal tribunal persons charged with
genocide may be brought before it, provided jurisdiction of such a court has been
recognized by the contracting states.4 2
The Declaration, in contrast, does not purport to be an enforceable covenant,43
"See Dep't State Pub. No. 3416 (1949). "See Dep't State Pub. No. 3381 (1949).
'2 See REPORa OF Ta FiF' SEssIoN OF THE COMMIsSSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE Eco oMc AND
SOCIAL COUNICIL, May 9-June 2o, 1949, U. N. Doc. E/1371, Annex I.
" Id. Annex III. Various other activities of the United Nations on behalf of human rights are omitted
from the present discussion. Such activities include among others, the work of the Sub-Commission
on Freedom of Information and the Press; the Commission on the Status of Women; the Trusteeship
System; the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, etc.
For a brief survey see UNITED NATIONS, FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1948), and current issues of
UNaED NATIONS BULLETIN. See also REPORT OF FIFTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTs,
supra note 32.
" See U. N. Documents Nos. A/PV 179 (December 9, 3948), and A/PV 383 (December lo, 1948).
There were no abstentions and none opposed to the Genocide Convention. A/PV 179 at 70. The Declara-
tion was also unanimously approved, but with eight abstentions: Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, South Africa, Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia. A/PV 383, at 16x-165.
" GENOCIDE CONVENTION Art. I. See generally Comment, Genocide: A Commentary on the Con-
vention, 58 YALE L. J. 3142 (1949).
"0 Id. Art. 1I. " d. Art. IV. "8Id. Art. III.
"I Id. Art. V. "Id. Art. IX. "Id. Art. VIII.
"d. Art. VI.
"See REPORT OF ma Co tssiSoN ow HUMIAN RIGHTS TO THE EcoNoIc AND SOCIAL COUNCIL ON
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nor is it designed to suppress a particular offense; it is a general expression of world
policy as to civil and social rights, a policy of which the Genocide Convention is a
striking application. It is a declaration of past achievement and future aspiration"
and comprises the first step in the creation of an International Bill of Human Rights,
a tripartite program to include ultimately conventions imposing international obli-
gation for enforcement on both the domestic and international level. The product
of compromise necessitated by wide divergence in economic resources available to
fulfill its moral commitments45 and in emphasis with respect to relation between
citizen and state,4 the Declaration provides for three basic types of rights: civil
liberties and political rights; economic and social rights; and international rights.
The first of these extends to personal liberties, including among others freedom and
security of the person, freedom of thought, religion, assembly, etc.,47 as well as the
political right to participate in government on an equal basis;48 while the second
category includes the right to social security, work, and choice of employment, and
to education, leisure, and an adequate standard of living40 The rights to nationality,
freedom of transit, and political asylum comprise the third category. ° Limited as
it is to moral suasion, the Declaration nevertheless occupies a powerful political
position; it commands the attention of world public opinion.
Of more immediate importance from a legal point of view is the Covenant,
presently in draft form for presentation to the Economic and Social Council.'l
Like the Charter and the Genocide Convention it is conceived as a treaty commit-
ting signatories to specific obligations. Its substantive provisions, for the most
part the same as Articles 2-20 of the Declaration,53 extend to protection of life and
liberty, 4 against torture, mutilation, and slavery;,; of freedom of religion and
thought," of speech, assembly, and association.57 The alien is protected against
arbitrary expulsion;5 and equal protection before the law, as well as with respect
to all rights defined by the covenant, is accorded to all.59 Imprisonment for debt is
prohibited, 0 as are ex post facto laws6' and restrictions upon the movement of per-
THE SEcoND SESSION OF TE CoMRassioN, December 2-17, 1947, U. N. Doe. E/6oo, p. xg; Report of the
Working Group, id. at 36, 37; Comments by United Kingdom Representative, U. N. Doc. E/CN 4/82
Add. 9, 1948, P. 2; see Hendrick, Progress Report on Human Rights, 19 DEP'r STATE BULL. 159, 16o
(1948).
"See Preamble, supra note 31.
"'See Martin, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 3 WORLD AFFAIRS 292, 297 (1949)"
" Id. at 296; see Malik, International Bill of Human Rights, 5 U. N. BULL. 519, 521 (1948).
47THE DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIsS, Arts. 3-20.
"' Id. Art. 21. "9 1d. Arts. 22-29. "0 1d. Arts. 13-15.
51 See REPoRr oF THE CommissIoN oN HumAN RIGHTS, U. N. Doe., E/1371, supra note 32. Both the
draft Covenant and the proposals on implementation have been sent to member governments for com-
ment, and are thereafter to be considered by the Economic and Social Council. See U. N. Doe., E/CN
4/191, 31 May, 1949.
" See Part II, Draft Covenant of Human Rights.
" The exceptions are the right to privacy, asylum, nationality, and private property, Arts. 12, 14, 15,
and 17 of the Declaration.
5 4 COVENANT Art. 5. rId. Arts. 6, 7, and 8. 'lid. Art. 16.
"Id. Arts. 17-19. aId. Art. 12. "Id. Art. 2o.
6 0 Id. Art. so. "Id. Art. 14.
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sons within a state."2 Particular emphasis is given the rights of the accused, both
while under preliminary detention as well as in the course of subsequent trial. Such
persons are accorded the right to a proceeding in the nature of a habeas corpus,
notice of the charge, and a speedy termination of detention.P There is explicit pro-
vision in the case of both civil and criminal offenses for a "fair and public trial," the
right to counsel, confrontation by witnesses, compulsory attendance of witnesses, and,
finally, for the right of presumed innocence.0 4 Signatories of this treaty-which has
application to public officials and private individuals as well as to states65 -would
be obligated to make these provisions part of domestic law.66 Beyond this the means
of enforcement as an international measure is still a subject of debate within the
Commission on Human Rights.67  Whether the Covenant is intended to be self-
executing remains at present in doubt also. 8 In this respect, as in respect to the
general war suspension clause69 and certain other provisions,70 the Covenant remains
incomplete.
On the details of implementation the Commission has reached agreement on only
one-an obvious-point, namely, that states shall be permitted to initiate complaints
for enforcement, whatever the form of implementation finally adopted 1 In the
fifth session in May-June, 1949, the right of petition by individuals, groups, or organi-
zations was discussed but not agreed upon, the consensus being that further study
" Id. Art. ix. " 1d. Art. 9. "Id. Art. 13.
"Id. Art. 2. 60 Ibid.
The Commission has barely broached its agenda on this subject. For discussions in the Fifth Session
of the Commission (May-June 1949), see U. N. Documents E/CN4 /SR 105, E/CN4 /SR sss, E/CN4/SR
114, E/CN4/SR xi5 , E/CN4/SR 118, E/CN4/SR 1ig, E/CN4 /SR 732, E/CN4 /r33; also E/1371
supra note 32.
" See Arts. 2 and 24. No definitive text for either article has been decided upon by the Commission,
though Art. 2 has been provisionally adopted pending completion of Part II of the Covenant. The
American proposal that Article 2 should contain language to the effect that "The provisions of this
Covenant shall not themselves become effective as domestic law," was rejected by the Commission (see
E/CN4/SR 125, 22 June 1949). As it now stands paragraph i of the Article 2 reads: "Each state party
hereto undertakes to ensure to all individuals within its jurisdiction the rights defined in this Covenant.
Where not already provided by legislative or other measures, each State undertakes, in accordance with
its constitutional processes and in accordance with the provisions of this Covenant, to adopt within a
reasonable time such legislative or other measures to give effect to the rights defined in this Covenant."
E/1371, p. 28.
05 Art. 4.
0 Concerning Part I the Commission has decided to postpone consideration of the Preamble and
Article s until the completion of Part II, or until, as in the case of Article 3, implementation measures
are considered. Articles 2 and 4 have been provisionally adopted pending completion of Part II. Dis-
cussion of Article 17 in Part II has been postponed until the Sixth Session of the Commission, and Article
21 until Article 17 is considered. Of Part III, only Article 23 dealing with ratification and accession has
been completed. Numerous texts for the remaining three Articles are included in the Report of the
Commission to the Economic and Social Council. See U. N. Document E/A371, Annex I.
Even the substantive terms of Part II still seem in question. See Draft Resolution, under the head-
ing "Draft International Covenant on Human Rights," submitted by the Commission to the Council,
requesting information on U. N. activities involving economic and social rights (Articles 22-27 of the
Declaration) "for the purpose of enabling the Commission to determine what actions it should take in
these fields...." U. N. Document E/1371 Annex IV.
Art. 7 which deals with prohibitions against scientific and medical experimentation has been sent for
comment to the World Health Organization. See E/1371, Annex III p. 30.
"'U. N. Doe. E/CN4/SR z14-.5, E/1371, p. 15.
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of the problem of handling such petitions was needed. 72 As to the requisite type
of enforcement machinery, extensive suggestions have been made, running between
the extremes of conservative American-British and radical Australian proposals. The
former, excluding individual petition by providing for reference to the International
Court of Justice,73 envisages public protest and direct negotiation by a complaining
state, in addition to hearings and investigation by a specially appointed United Na-
tions Committee. 74 The latter calls for an International Court of Human Rights.7 '
At the request of the Commission, member governments are presently considering
all alternatives of implementation, whether eventually to be effected through provision
in the Covenant itself,7 6 or by appended protocol,77 or through a separate convention
as originally intended.78
It is regrettable that in terms of content the Covenant as presently drafted falls
far short of the promise of the Declaration. It neither guarantees participation in
government, the sine qua non of freedom, nor stipulates any aspirations about that
economic well-being upon which today depends the fulfillment in fact of any human
rights.
III
The principal attack from within the United States upon this program of the
United Nations has come from certain leaders of the American Bar Association,
notably President Holman and ex-President Rix.70 Though characterized more by
"
2 U. N. Doc. E/CN4/SR 115, 118, 119, 132, 133; E/1371, p. 19.
" Art. 34 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides: "I. Only states may be
parties in cases before the Court." Dep't State Pub. No. 2368, Conference Series 76.
"'See U. N. Doc. E/CN4/2 7 4/Rev. 1, 3
r May 1949; also the earlier Chinese-U. S. Proposal on
Implementation which is substantially the same, though less detailed. E/CN4/145, 16 June 1948.
"'See E/CN4/AC.i/27, zo May 1948; also E/1371, p. 61. Other suggestions have been put for-
ward by France: E/CN4 /147, 1948; E/CN4 /82/Add. 1o, 5948; E/CN4 /82/Add. so/R. s, 1949;
E/1371 p. 7o; by India: E/CN4 /isr (amendment to Chinese-U. S. Proposals); E/CN4/153, 21 June
1948; E/1371 p. 77; by Guatemala: E/CN4 /29 3 , E/1371 p. 75. See also Report of Working Group
on Implementation E/6oo p. 33 et. seq. (Dec. 1947). The conclusion drawn by Russia relative to the
various proposals is that they seek to engender systems of international pressure; to interfere with the
internal affairs of States in conflict with the "whole system of international public law"; and to trans-
form disputes between individuals into disputes between States. For these reasons all the proposals are
considered unsatisfactory. See USSR Statement, E/CN4 /s5 4, 24 June 1948; also in E/x371, p. 78.
"0 The current U. S. view. See E/CN4/SR ixi.
7 7 Ibid. "s See Malik, id. at 6.
' Holman, "11n International Bill of Rights": Proposals Have Dangerous Implications for U. S., 34
A.B.A.J. 984 (1948), cited hereinafter as "Holman article," and President Holman's Comments on Mr.
Moskowitz's Reply, 35 A.B.A.J. 228 (1949), cited hereinafter as "Holman reply"; Rix, Human Rights
and International Law: Effect of the Covenant Under Our Constitution, 35 A.B.A.J. 551 (1949), cited
hereinafter as "Rix" (first delivered as an address to the annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law in Washington on April 29, 1949). For other references to the human rights pro-
gram see Editorial, The Declaration and the Covenant, 35 A.B.A.J. 40-41 (1949); Report of the Com-
mittee for Peace and Law, presented to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, and
comments thereon, 35 A.B.A.J. 196 (1949); Mr. Holman's remarks in "President's Page," 35 A.B.A.J.
201-202 (1949); Editorial, Wyman, Human Rights and the Declaration, 35 A.B.A.J. 406-408 (x949). See
also Universal Human Rights, 34 MAss. L. Q. 45-84 (1949).
The views expressed are uniform in their opposition to the program. The decision of the President
and Board of Governors of the Association to promote a campaign of study of the proposals through
regional meetings, study groups, and conferences--see 35 A.B.A.J. 40 (1949)--scems hardly to have
evoked the enlightened discussion expected.
For answer to the bar leaders see Moskowitz, Is the U. N.'s Bill of Human Rights Dangerous? A4
Reply to President Holman, 35 A.B.A.J. 283 (1949).
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rambling fulmination and quibbling questioning than by direct assertion which
could be controverted, this attack may be said in reasonable summary to emphasize
three main pointsfs  The first charge is that the United Nations program for
human rights is an invasion of the domestic jurisdiction of the United States and
other nations that has nothing to do with the maintenance of peace or any other
matter of legitimate international concern. The second is that United States' par-
ticipation in this program is unconstitutional and beyond the scope of the treaty
or other federal power, since the program deals with matters more of state and local
than of international or even national concern. The final charge is that United
States' participation in the program is dangerously impolitic for a variety of reasons,
the most important of which is that the program embodies an awesome threat to
our free-enterprise system and form of government, stemming from economic re-
formers, professors, and Mrs. Roosevelt.s '
The "domestic jurisdiction" charge is developed in various ways. Both Mr.
Holman 2 and Mr. Rix8s invoke Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations
Charter, which reads in part: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present charter .. ."4 To bring human rights with-
in this reservation and exclude them from international concern, Mr. Holman insists
that "the whole purpose of the United Nations is to achieve peace" and that the
maintenance of peace and preservation of human rights are separate problems, sug-
gesting that neither of "the world wars were caused by the absence of an Inter-
national Bill of Rights or primarily by subnormal or abnormal conditions in any
country" and that at the time of launching these wars Germany "had the most ad-
vanced social and economic program of any nation in the world. 8.5  He insists
further that the United Nations is primarily "an organization of states," operating
"on an international level with government meeting government," while a "bill of
rights, on the other hand, has nothing to do directly with the relations between
governments; it exists primarily to define the relations between a government or
state and the individual citizens thereof; basically it relates to internal affairs and
not to international matters.""8 In a declaration before the House of Delegates of
the Bar Association Mr. Holman summarizes: "For the first time we have the pro-
posals to take away from our people, their state and local government, and their
so If it be objected that our summary makes the bar leaders' attack too forthright, our query is then:
what do they mean?
81 "We are dealing with a missionary spirit on the part of social and economic reformers to establish
throughout the world their social and economic ideas...." Holman article, 985.
"She [Mrs. Roosevelt] and a few others, including Professor Jessup, have undertaken to bind the
American people without their knowledge and consent." Holman reply, 290.
:2 Holman article, 1o8o, 985. s Rix, 618.
a' The omitted words are: "but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII."
" Holman article, 985. 8 6 ibid.
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national government as well, their control over the matters which have always been
'of domestic jurisdiction.' "8s Mr. Rix's contribution to this point is to ride hard
the nineteeth century canards that "international law is the law of states and their
relations to each other, with all enforcement and negotiations in the states alone"
and that it is inappropriate for international law to purport to concern itself with
the relations between a nation-state and its citizens. 8 He asserts that the "reserva-
tion of domestic questions, known as Article 2 (7), is perfectly plain and concise"
and that despite all the provisions in the United Nations Charter which call for
"promoting, assisting, encouraging, recommending the cause of human rights,"
there has been no "creation of any contractual liability for recognition of human
rights by any state."' 9
The constitutional argument is more evasive, taking the form largely of vague
questions. Thus, Mr. Rix inquires, quite irrelevantly to any question of constitutional
power to secure human rights, "Is there no limit to the power of Congress acting
under a treaty except that of prohibition in the Constitution," and, as if he were
asking something new and unanswered, "Shall the treaty-making power be used
as the basis for enactment of domestic legislation in the United States," and "What
is the effect of treaty law as domestic law of the land, as supreme law under the
Constitution.""0  Though he is nowhere explicit about limitations on the treaty
power or other federal power over foreign affairs, Mr. Rix quotes with approval the
well-known address of Chief Justice Hughes which distinguishes agreements relating
to "the conduct of our international relations" from those which do not "pertain
to our external relations" but rather to matters "normally and appropriately" within
"the local jurisdictions of the states," and assumes, without halting for reflection orA
the question of fact, that "the wise words of Chief Justice Hughes" give sufficient
answer to the question whether the treaty-making power shall be used as the basis
for enactment of domestic legislation on human rights."' Referring to a suggestion
of the President's Committee on Civil Rights that the treaty-making power might
be so used, he finds that the "road to federal absolutism, is being made very, very
easy." 92 Missouri v. Holland,9 3 in which Justice Holmes delivered his famous and
statesmanlike opinion on the scope of the treaty power, is described as the case "in
which Leviathan, with deep concern for the food supply of wild duck for a suffering
people, blithely asserted that there is no limit in the United States to the treaty-
making power and legislation enacted thereon unless it is prohibited by the Consti-
tution."9 Fearing the "destruction of a cherished system of our division of powers
of government,"95 Mr. Rix has this to say of the potentialities of the Genocide Con-
vention and of the proposed Covenant on Human Rights: ".... there may be created,
87 Comment by Mr. Holman before the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, January
3, 1949. See 35 A.B.A.J. 196 (1949).
uRIx, 552. I ld. at 618. 'ld. at 552.
'
1 1d. at 554, 618. o'Id. at 618. "See infra, Section V.
"Id. at 554. "Id. at 552.
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as law, a third body of treaty law in this country with no constitutional basis what-
soever, of equal dignity with the Constitution, as supreme law of the land, super-
seding all state constitutions, decisions and laws of the states covering the same sub-
jects, and probably superior to all prior enacted laws of Congress on the subject.""0
The consequences of this "in a field which has been almost exclusive [sic] in the
states, is so far-reaching ... that the word revolutionary is not fully descriptive. '""r
Mr. Holman also thinks this "dangerous." ' The problem is considered aggravated
by Supreme Court decisions dealing with centralization of federal power, by the
recent restrictive covenant cases, and by the lack of uniformity in state anti-discrimi-
natory employment legislation. With respect to restrictive covenants Mr. Holman
urges, despite the Supreme Court ruling that they are not enforceable, that "the
United States should not subscribe to setting aside what has been long established
and recognized as a proper restriction with respect at least to limited areas of prop-
erty.""0 In any event Mr. Holman, apparently hopeful, suggests these cases may be
overruled. 100 A minor constitutional theme, much emphasized, is that in inter-
national undertakings of this kind this country is peculiarly vulnerable since, in
contrast with the further action required in most countries, under Article VI (2) of
our Constitution self-executing treaties upon ratification immediately become the
law of the land-apparently irrevocably, since "this country is not in the habit of
ratifying treaties with the intention of repudiation."' '
The final charge that the human rights program is dangerously impolitic for the
United States is made explicit enough. Its general tenor, repeated over and over,
is that the provisions of the Declaration and proposed Covenant in so far as they
are traditional are vague and unnecessary and likely to expose us to a "Pandora's
box of complaints" from within and without, and in so far as they are not traditional
are long steps toward "world-wide socialism," if not communism.0" Thus, in
strong isolationist vein Mr. Holman asserts that we risk "many international irrita-
tions and provocations" from "United Nations intervention in the domestic affairs
of nations."'0 3 If, he develops his theme, "the United Nations, through its own
interpretation, is the final arbiter of what constitutes a matter of international con-
cern then by its ipse dixit, the acts of our citizens, our courts and our public officials
will be amenable to examination and condemnation and eventual control by the
United Nations.' ' 4  Worse still, "both individuals and pressure groups in other
countries, even in Russia, could have a Roman holiday in asking American cities
and states, and even our federal Government, for extended explanations regarding
the observance and protection by them of so-called human rights with respect to our
own citizens.""'3 "I leave to your imagination," states Mr. Rix, "as to what would
"Id. at 554. OT Ibid.
o Holman article, io8i. " Id. at 1079.
200 Ibid. 101 Rix, 554. See also, Holman reply, 360.
"'2 Holman article, io8o, 985. Holman reply, 29o.
103 Holman article, 985. ,o Holman reply, 290.
Id. at 361.
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happen in the field of administration of municipal law if subversive elements should
teach minorities that the field of civil rights and laws had been removed to the
field of international law... .," The introduction of the principle of individual
as against state responsibility into international law will inevitably create "correlative
rights and privileges .. . to an utterly unknown degree." 107 The charge that the
program will promote "state socialism, if not communism, throughout the world"'08
is supported by allegations that it will foster "economic and social boons, bounties
and benefits" which encourage a "planned economy or welfare state,'""OC that it is
"paternalistic" and "minimizes the incentive for initiative and progress,"" 0 and that
it emphasizes "rights" but not "responsibility.""' From a view, as parochial as un-
realistic, it is urged that foreign standards of human rights (impliedly, without
qualification, inferior to ours) will be enforced against us to the detriment of our
own Bill of Rights; and, conversely, that while human rights in the United States
are God-given and inalienable, peoples abroad are not so endowed and should not
have human rights imposed on them.n 2  One crowning non-sequitur is the argu-
ment that omission from the Covenant of any right deemed essential, the right
to own property for instance (a right included in the Declaration), automatically
limits the exercise of that right in the United States." A prominent and recurrent
emphasis is that we must go slow, that international law is not made "in the twin-
kling of an eye," that it is better to await the "evolutionary process of building cus-
tomary law" and not use that prime instrument of international legislation, agree-
ment, or treaty, which is described as "summary process."114
IV
The recital in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter that "nothing contained
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter" is,
despite the contrary allegations of the bar leaders, utterly irrelevant to any issues
posed for either the United States or any other nation-state by the proposed Covenant
on Human Rights and the Genocide Convention. This limitation in the Charter,
whatever meaning may eventually be ascribed to it or whoever may eventually be
decided to have power to interpret it,"35 is a limitation only on the organization set
10' Rix, 554- 107 Rix, 554. 108 Holman article, xo8o.
109 Report of the Committee on Peace and Law, 35 A.B.A.J. 196 (x949).
11 Holman article, io8o.
"" Wyman, Human Rights and the Declaration, 35 A. B. A. J. 406, 408 (1949).
"Remarks of Mr. George A. Finch at the 7949 meeting of the Amcrcian Society of International
Law, which will appear in the 7949 Proceedings of the Society. See also Wyman, supra note xix, at 407.
11. Holman article, 986. 114 Rix, 551.
"" For a brief indication of the variety of opinion on these points see LELAND M. GOODRICIt AND
EDvARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATioNS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS IzO et seq. (rev.
ed. 1949).
Among the more useful discussions of Article 2(7), putting it in proper perspective, are Goodrich,
The United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction, 3 Ir. ORG. 74 (1949); FINcHsM, Do~REsroc JURISoCTION
(1948); Gross, Impact of the United Nations upon Domestic Jurisdiction, 78 DEP'r STATE BULL. 259
(1948); Comment, 47 COL. L. Rxv. 268 (1947).
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up by the Charter and upon activities which depend upon the Charter for their
constitutional base.110 The proposed Covenant on Human Rights and the Genocide
Convention are to be new agreements, stemming from the same nation-state power,
"the competence attached to sovereignty," 117 that established the United Nations
Charter and which remains competent to clarify or supplement the obligations
assumed in that Charter to promote respect for and observance of human rights.
There is nothing in the United Nations Charter or in any other international agree-
ment or in customary international law which derogates in the slightest degree
from the power and competence of the members of the United Nations to make
further agreements about human rights and to establish common standards, to what-
ever extent desired, about practices within their respective jurisdictions, "domestic" or
otherwise." The obvious and fundamental principle of customary law is well
stated by Sir Arnold McNair: ". . . international law regards a State as being in-
vested for international purposes with complete power-vis-a-vis another contracting
party-to alienate or otherwise affect the rights of its nationals, both property and
personal, and to impose liabilities upon them.""' 9 More affirmatively, it is uniformly
116 The assurances, therefore, of Mr. Stettinius that domestic questions were reserved at San Francisco-
assurances upon which Mr. Rix heavily relies (see Rix, 618)--are irrelevant in so far as the substance of
the Covenant and the Genocide Convention is concerned. Referring to the enlargement of the scope of
Art. 2, paragraph 7, to cover "activities of the organization as a whole, instead of limiting it to the pacific
settlement of disputes as had been proposed at Dumbarton Oaks," Mr. Stettinius stated that "the possi-
bility is now definitely excluded" that "the Economic and Social Council could interfere directly in the
domestic economy, social structure, or cultural or educational arrangements of the member States."
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 9 th Cong., Ist Sess. 58 (1945).
Compare the official remarks of Committee 11/3 at San Francisco relating to the objectives of the
Economic and Social Council:
"There were some misgivings that the statement of purposes now recommended implied
that the Organization might interfere in the domestic affairs of member countries. To
remove all possible doubt, the Committee agreed to include in its records the following
statement:
'The members of Committee 3 of Commission II are are in full agreement that nothing
contained in Chapter IX [International Economic and Social Cooperation] can be construed
as giving authority to the Organization to intervene in the domestic affairs of member
States.' (Italics supplied.)
"The Committee agreed that it was desirable to reinforce the statement of purposes
by a pledge on the part of individual members. The precise wording of the pledge was
extensively debated and the form finally agreed upon reads as follows:
'All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with
the Organization for the achievement of these purposes.'" 8 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCIsco, 1945 81-82 (945).
(Italics supplied.)
See also the decision that it is for the Organization to "promote" human rights, but for the States to
"protect" them, except where "rights and freedoms are grievously outraged so as to create conditions
which threaten peace or to obstruct the application of provisions of the Charter," when they cease to be
the sole concern of each State. 6 id. at 705.
1
'
7 The phrase is Oppenheim's. i L. F. L. OPPENHIIM, INTERNATIONtL LAW 795 (Lauterpacht ed.
1948).
"" The general point is well developed by Charles Fahy, then Legal Adviser of the Department of
State, in discussing comparable problems raised by the International Trade Organization Charter in
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, Part s, 8oth Cong., ist. Sess. (947).
"" ARNOLD D. McNAnR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 335 (1938). Cf. OPPENHFIM, op. cit. supra note X117,
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established by authority as high as the Permanent Court of International Justice
that nation-states may by agreement take matters, such as nationality, out of what
might otherwise be regarded as "domestic jurisdiction" and make them of inter-
national concern and subject to international regulation. 20  If, finally, the inspiring
words, so many times repeated, of the United Nations Charter are not to be taken as
sheer mockery and humbuggery of the peoples of the world, that Charter itself, with
its clear statement of major purpose and several undertakings, must be construed, not
as precluding member states from further concern and agreement about human
rights, but rather as obligating them to such action.
It cannot in fact be disguised, by any amount of reverent invocation of irrelevant
technicalities, that the real issue posed for the United States, as for every other
nation-state, is the policy issue: whether it should enter into new agreements of
the type proposed.' 2' The critical question in simplest terms is whether or not
the human rights and security, in the sense of freedom to pursue all values by demo-
cratic procedures, of the people of the United States, and of any other peoples with
whom they identify, are sufficiently at stake to justify the United States in assuming
obligations of the kind proposed in return for other nation-states assuming recipro-
cal obligations. Rational answer to this question depends, not upon exercises in
at 804. Potter, Inhibitions Upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United States, 28 Am. J. INT'L L. 456,
463 (934) writes:
". .. international law bestows a plenary power of concluding treaties upon every
State. A priori, and in the absence of any valid restrictions of a special nature arising from
either national or international sources, the power of the United States and of its treaty-
making agency to conclude agreements with other states which are mutually acceptable to
both is unlimited, in terms of either subject matter or of type of treatment for that subject
matter to be provided in the agreement, assuming freedom from the exercise of force or
fraud upon the negotiators at the time of concluding the treaty. Such plenary power con-
tinues to accompany, or stand back of, and possibly exceed, the degree of treaty-making
power purporting to be granted by the national constitution. The making of treaties by the
states antedated the formation of modern international law, and the latter emerged as a
result of that process, but today it is international law which sustains treaty-making, and
that in plenary degree."
120 Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1923, Publications
of the Court, Ser. B, No. 4 (Advisory Opinon) (1923); see also German Settlers in Poland, P.C.I.J.,
Ser. B, No. 7, P. x6 (1923); Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Upper Silesia, P.C.LJ., Ser.
A, No. 6, pp. 14, 15 (1925); Treatment of Polish Nationals . . . in Danzig Territory, P.C.I.J. Set. Ax B,
No. 44, P. 42. Cf. PmLIp C. JEssus', A MODER, LAw OF NA-nONs 87 (1948).
... This is the issue even if one assumes, as the bar leaders insist, that Article 2(7) of the United
Nations Charter is relevant and that for the purposes of that Article the United States is the exclusive
judge of what is within its domestic jurisdiction. The United States must still determine what it will
consider within its domestic jurisdiction.
With the bar leaders' horror of the suggestion that the interpretation of Article 2(7) may be a matter
of international concern, may be contrasted Judge Hudson's strictures on this same article in The World
Court: America's Declaration Accepting Jurisdiction, 32 A.B.A.J. 832, 835 (1932): "This text marks
a distinct retrogression. Unlike that in the Covenant, and unlike the previous Declarations accepting
the Permanent Court's jurisdiction, it provides no competent forum for the determination of the
question whether a matter is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
The insight and vision of earlier bar leaders with respect to the comparable problem of the juris-
diction of the International Court are indicated in Hudson, supra; Preuss, Questions Resulting from the
Connally Amendment, 32 A.B.A.J. 66o (1946), and Jurisdiction of World Court: Reasons for Urging a
New American Declaration, 33 A.B.A.J. 430 (947); Withdrawal of Connally Amendment as to the
World Court is Urged, 34 A.B.A.J. 186, 256 (948).
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authoritative doctrine, but upon correct orientation in realm of fact-in the realm
of present degrees of, and probable future trends in, interdependence among the
peoples of the world with respect to human rights and security. Mr. Holman's
insistence upon the separateness of the problems of human rights and peace, with
documentation by reference to the course of Nazi Germany, suggests a very con-
siderable disorientation. Because of the demands, conditions, and trends indicated
in the introductory paragraphs of this article, we prefer to take our stand with the
great bulk of mankind-witness the general consciousness pervading not only the
declarations of war aims and the framing of the United Nations organization and
its subsidiaries, but also the subsequent pronouncements and practices of the United
Nations agencies and the late frantic scrambling for regional pacts and associations-
who see both a general, irrevocable interdependence of all peoples everywhere as to
all values and a specific connection between the internal tyranny of nation-states
and their external aggression.'
22
For resolution of the issue of policy thus posed for the United States and other
nation-states, one fact at least is certain: there is nothing in the technical concept
"domestic jurisdiction," whether considered generally or as put forward in the
United Nations Charter, that offers any guidance. The words "domestic jurisdic-
tion" are neither possessed of any intrinsic or absolute meaning nor are they self-
defining.123  Neither official pronouncement nor practice of states has ever given
them a very precise meaning for any purpose, much less of relevance to rati6nal
action about human rights in the contemporary world.124  Introduced into the
Covenant of the League of Nations on the suggestion of American statesmen in the
vain hope of appeasing isolationist sentiment, this "mischievous phrase" has, in the
apt description of a distinguished critic, 25 become a "new catchword" or verbal
"idol" to serve the same old function that words like "sovereignty, .... independence,"
and "state equality" have so long served. That function is much too often to put
a stop to thought, to summarize conclusions reached on unexpressed or perhaps
even unexamined or unconscious grounds, and to assert arbitrary refusal to negoti-
ate or cooperate on problems regarded by other states as of common concern. When
definition is proffered by disinterested authority, it is invariably cast in terms of
relativity.' Thus, the Permanent Court in a much quoted passage asserted: "The
question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a
state is essentially a relative question; it depends upon the development of inter-
122 It surely cannot be seriously suggested that Russia's systematic exclusions from access to political
power, repression of all opposition, and iron-curtain policy with respect to enlightenment have no
bearing on her foreign policy or her peoples' willingness to accept that policy.
.2 Cf. Preuss, The International Court of Justice, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 720, 726 (1946).
'"'FIuCHAM, op. cit. supra note 115, offers complete review.
" Professor James L. Brierly. His early article, from which the quotations are taken, 6 BruTr. Y. B.
INTr'L L. 8 (1925), is still the most incisive analysis. For later developments see Bentwich, The Limits
of the Domestic Jurisdiction of the State, 31 TR. o GRius SociETry 59 (1945); Davies, Domestic
Jurisdiction, 32 Th. oF GRorsus SociETv 6o (1946).
... Fstmm, op. ct. supra note 115, at 40.
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national relations."'1' Such definition obviously merely restates the question
of the facts about world-wide interdependence. It may be instructive to note that
in all the discussion that attended the framing of Article 2(7) of the United Nations
Charter very little effort was devoted to clarifying the meaning of the limitation
proposed for the organization. The record of San Francisco reveals (i) a design
to extend the scope of paragraph 7 (limited in Dumbarton Oaks to the pacific
settlement of disputes) to all the organs and activities of the United Nations, (2) a
considerable diversity of opinion as to who should interpret the paragraph, (3) a
belief that "essentially" is broader than the League word "solely," and (4) some
notion that traditional international law is too vague and antiquated to assist in
definition; but there is practically no discussion of what in substance constitutes
"matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."12 There is evi-
dence indeed of deliberate intent to postpone clarification for the future development
of practice. Thus, Mr. Dulles for the United States, in rejecting the standard of
international law, "pointed out that international law was subject to constant change
and therefore escaped definition," and insisted that "it would, in any case, be difficult
to define whether or not a given situation came within the domestic jurisdiction of
a state."'" "In this era," the official paraphrase continues, "the whole internal life
of a country was affected by foreign conditions." The record reads:130
In summary, Mr. Dulles stressed the virtues of the principal-its breadth and its
simplicity. The Organization in none of its branches or organs should intervene in what
was essentially the domestic life of the member states. Moreover, this principle was
subject to evolution. The United States had had long experience in dealing with a
parallel problem, i.e., the relationship between the forty-eight states and the Federal
Government. Today, the Federal Government of the United States exercised an
authority undreamed of when the Constitution was formed, and the people of the
United States were grateful for the simple conceptions contained in their Constitution.
In like manner, Mr. Dulles foresaw that if the Charter contained simple and broad
principles future generations would be thankful to the men at San Francisco who had
drafted it.
When Mr. Dulles had concluded, "the Chairman moved a vote of thanks" for "his
masterly exposition" and "Mr. Evatt rose to second this motion." Clearly "domestic
jurisdiction" still awaits content from the realities of the contemporary world power
process.
Equally unenlightening for rational policy decision by the United States or others
is the doctrinal half-truth, paraded by the bar leaders, that traditional international
law concerns itself only with states and not with individuals. Even if it were a
fact that traditional doctrines designed to regulate relations between nation-states in
" Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, supra note 120.
.
2 FiNcHA, op. cit. supra note s15, at 147. See 6 DOCUaMNTS OF THE UNImTED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO 507-513, 110-11 (945); also REPORT To IEr PREst-
DENT, supra note 116, at 26, 57-58.
126 Docum rs, supra note 128, at 508. 230 ibid.
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'an unscientific age of subsidized piracy, matchlocks, wood fires and candlelight,
wide-open spaces, and glorification of cruel aggressive force for selfish profit' u
were not designed and did little to protect the individual human being, that fact
would be of little relevance to the task of defining doctrine and creating institutions
appropriate for protecting the individual human being in this atomic era. It is not
questioned of course that in recent centuries nation-states have been the principal
participants in the world power process and that by reason of habitual anthro-
pomorphic reification such states have been made the principal addressees of the
doctrines of international law. The fact is, however, despite all the hair-splitting
about the "subjects" and 'objects" of international law, the ultimate beneficiary of
its doctrines has always been the individual. In eloquent castigation of the reiterated
view that international law "is a law between states" under which "individuals
have no rights and no personality," Professor Frederick Dunn states :"32 "In my view,
this particular legal fossil is highly misleading and in large degree false, and its
continued hold on the minds of many people explains in part why international law
is held in such ill repute by laymen today." Referring to the common rule that
international law is part of the law of the land, Lauterpacht praises the rule as "an
beneficent doctrine inasmuch as it brings into prominence the fact that the obliga-
tions of international law are, in the last resort, addressed to individual human be-
ings."'33 Often quoted is the wisdom of Westlake: "the duties and rights of states
are only the duties and rights of the men who compose them.' ' 34 Emphasis upon
the theoretical relation of "states" to the exclusion of individuals is in fact of rela-
tively recent origin, a product of nineteenth century positivism 33 The law of
nations of previous centuries with its roots in natural law, both Christian3 6 and
Greek, and in the jus gentium of the Roman world, gave a primary place to the indi-
vidual, the very essence of natural law being that sense of moral justice, of "right
reason," which has no meaning except in terms of a heightened awareness of the
worth of human personality' 3 7 Even the most casual glance at the works of Grotius
and Pufendorf-or even Vattel-demonstrates the tremendous impact of this idea.
Clearly it was a principal consideration in the efforts of Grotius, the accepted father
of international law, to restore order to the troubled world of the seventeenth century.
It is indeed only from the narrowest perspectives of international law as conceived
3. Borrowed from Bingham, The Continental Shelf and the Marginal Belt, 40 At. J. INT'L L. 173,
178 (1946).
.. Dunn, The International Rights of Individuals, PRoc. A. Soc. INT'L L. 14 (941). Cf. Brown,
World Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 159 (1946); CHARLES G. FENwcx, INTE.NATIONAL LAW 134 (3d ed.
1948).
' OPPENEimt, Op. cit. supra note 117, at 21, 41.
134 JOHN Nsr.AInE, COLLECTED PAPERS ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1914).
"I Idelson, The Law of Nations and the Individual, 30 TR. OF GRoTnus SOCIETY 50 (1944).
"" For an enlargement of this orientation of Human Rights, see JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF
MAN AND NATURAL LAw (1943).
"'1 Idelson, supra note 135, at 5X; Report of Lord Porter's Committee on "International Law and the
Rights of the Individual," 3x TB. OF GRorws SOCIETY 90 (1946).
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in the period since Bentham that an observer can claim that even theoretically only
states, exclusive of individuals, are the subjects of international law. Apart from
theoretical considerations, nineteenth century international law, oriented as it was to
utilitarianism and laissez-faire, has in fact promoted the interests of individuals rather
than bare relations between sovereign states. This is the import of rules regarding
the diplomatic protection of citizens abroad, of the laws of war and of neutrality,
and of many of the doctrines about jurisdiction.' One has, furthermore, only to
look at the content of treaty-law to gain true perspective as to the preponderance of
concern for the activities of men over the inter-relations of states."' Treaty-law re-
veals also the beginning of a trend toward an increased role for the individual in the
procedural aspects of international law. Witness the granting of the right of indi-
vidual access to international tribunals, such as the Central American Court of
Justice, or the Arbitral Tribunals set up after the first World War.'40 In more re-
cent years the myth that nation-states are the sole subjects of international law has
received other fatal blows from the demands of a whole host of organizations-such
as the United Nations itself, the Bank, the Fund, and UNRRA-for "personality"
and all of its attendant rights and privileges in international doctrine and practice. 41
It is coming more and more to be recognized that nation-states, as important as they
are, are not the sole participants in the world power process, and that the most criti-
cal challenge of our time is the task of devising a world law appropriate for all the
new participants, such as international governmental organizations, transnational
political parties, transnational private associations (cartels), and even the humble indi-
vidual human being.14Z
Similarly without enlightenment and relevance to wise policy decision about the
human rights agreements is that other, complementary half-truth, invoked by the
bar leaders, that by traditional international law there can be no interference from
any source in the relations between a nation-state and its citizens. Even if it be
assumed that by customary international doctrine nation-states have been left largely
free to treat their own citizens as they will, the conclusion that such states cannot
agree, or that it is unwise for them to agree, to do otherwise is a transparent and
arrogant non-sequitur. As the American Bar Association's thoroughly considered
monograph, The International Law of the Future, recites with documentation: "In-
158 Dunn, supra note 132, at 15.
... It may be emphasized that all agreements which become the law of the land have very direct
effects on the citizens of a state.
140 Hambro, Individuals before International Tribunals, Paoc. AM. SoC. INT'L L. 28 (194); PHILIP
C. Jassup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 18-19 (1948); Idelson, supra note 135, at 6o; Aufricht, Personality
in International Law, 37 As. PoL. Sc. REv. 2x7 (1943).
141 See International Court of Justice Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion: INTERNAOAL CoURT OF JusTrcF REPoRTs 174 (1949); Reparation for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, oral statements by Kerno and Feller, United
Nations (1949). Jenks, The Legal Personality of International Organizations, 22 Biur. Y. B. IN'L L. It
(945); see also Idelson, supra note 135, at 59 and citations therein.
143 This is a principal theme of PHILIP C. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NArToNs (1948), generally
recognized as the most profound of contemporary books on its subject.
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stances are numerous in which states have assumed obligations with respect to
the treatment of their own nationals."'143 Wholly apart from agreement, states have
long assumed a prerogative of humanitarian intervention "when a State renders itself
guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its Nationals, in such a way as to deny
their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind."'144 Draw-
ing upon a variety of precedents, such as "long prescribed standards for a State's pro-
tection of aliens within its territory," and insisting that "nationals too should have
the benefit of the standard which the dictates of humanity and justice impose," the
American Bar Association monograph, mentioned above, generalizes in Principle 2:
"Each State has a legal duty to see that conditions prevailing within its own terri-
tory do not menace international peace and order, and to this end it must treat its
own population in a way which will not violate the dictates of humanity and justice
or shock the conscience of mankind."'1 5  Comment explains that this "Principle
would require of each State a minimum protection" of "all inhabitants of its terri-
tory."'146 A very recent precedent of world-wide renown and of potentially tre-
mendous influence may be found in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment' 47
Though principally acclaimed for its imposition of duties upon the individual irre-
spective of nation-state law, the Nuremberg precedent makes positive contribution
to the international protection of human rights. Along with crimes against peace
and war crimes, Article 6 of the Charter lists crimes against humanity: "Namely,
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecution on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated." Though limited by the judgment of the
Tribunal to "inhumane acts, in connection with the planning or waging of aggres-
sive war,"148 this concept of crimes against humanity is capable of future generaliza-
tion. The significance of the precedent is best stated by Professor Lauterpacht:
... Crimes against humanity are crimes regardless of whether they were committed
in accordance with and in obedience to the national law of the accused. Such acts
... AMERICAN BAR AssocIAnoN JOURNAL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE FUTURE 36 (i944). A
foreword indicates that the monograph is a product of some thirty regional conferences, inspired and
led by Judge Hudson. Cf. JEsstur, op. di. supra note 142, at 88.
144 OPPE'HEIm, Op. cit. supra note 157, at 280. Cf. I CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 249,
209 (2d ed. 1945) offering (at p. 211) prophetic understatement: "It is to be expected that international
society will ultimately evince an interest in the welfare of the private individual sufficient to cause
the law of nations to restrict the freedom of a State in the treatment of its nationals."
... Supra note 143, at 35-37. ... Id. at 36.
... An excellent brief summary appears in INTERNATIONAL LAw CommissSloN, UmrED NAxTONS, THE
CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NUREMBERO TRIBUNAL (1949).
Other contemporary rejections of the "act of state" doctrine also demonstrate that the relation between
a state and its own citizens is not the sacrosanct citadel that some mythology suggests, Comment, 57 YALE
L. J. io8 (1947). Note especially the acts of allied military government in setting aside Nazi expropria-
tions. If it is possible to act after the fact to make amends, how much more rational to act before the
event to prevent inhumanities from occurring.
... INTERNATIONAL LAW Coa missloN, op. di. supra note 147, at 68.
512 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
were deemed to violate the sanctity of human personality to such a degree as to make
irrelevant reliance upon the law of the State which ordered them. To lay down that
crimes against humanity are punishable is, therefore, to assert the existence of rights of
man grounded in a law superior to the law of the State. Thus, upon analysis, the enact-
ment of crimes against humanity in an international instrument signifies the acknowl-
edgment of fundamental rights of the individual recognised by international law.'4 0
The power of agreement to vary customary doctrine and impose special obligations
upon states in the treatment of their own citizens has, as the Bar Association mono-
graph suggests, been many times demonstrated. Among the better known examples
are the "minorities treaties" after World War I for the protection of racial, linguistic,
and religious groups, and the more general provisions in the peace treaties con-
cluded since World War II, examples which are being developed in other parts of
this symposium.' 50  Mention might also be made of "an imposing array" 1 of agree-
ments for repressing slavery and the slave trade, for promoting humane conditions
of labor, for preventing white-slavery, for policing opium trade, for protecting
aborigines, for safeguarding health, and so on.'5 The agreement we should like
most to emphasize is, however, the United Nations Charter itself. It is simple
anachronism to suggest that the proposed Human Rights Covenant and the Geno-
cide Convention embody revolutionary innovation. Whatever innovation there is,
the decisive break with all past unconcern of customary international law for human
rights, the generalization of all the many precedents indicated above into a principle
of positive concern, came with adoption of the Charter four years ago. "It is already
law," writes Ambassador Jessup in contrast to Mr. Rix, "at least for Members of the
United Nations, that respect for human dignity and fundamental human right is
obligatory. The duty is imposed by the Charter, a treaty to which they are parties."'
153
"" Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64 L. Q. Rlv. 97, 104 (1948). See also UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UmTED NATIONS WVAR CRIMES COMMISSION 174, 192
(1948); Brand, Crimes Against Humanity and the Nuremberg Trials, 28 OnE. L. REv. 119 (1949);
Lowenthal, Harris, Woolsey, and Farr, The Nuremberg Verdict, 6o HAtav. L. REv. 857, 884 (x947).
"'0 Articles by Mary G. Jones and Stephen Kertesz, infra.
5 Borrowed from OsPaNHzsm, op. cit. supra note 117, at 584.
1tS QUINCY WRIGHT, HUMAN RIGrrS AND WORLD ORDER 15 (Commission to Study the Organization
of Peace, 1942).
For international control of atomic energy the United States has proposed a system of inspection which
would invade the relations between a state and its citizens, and few observers outside the Soviet Union
doubt that such a measure is necessary to adequate enforcement of security. See StILs, THE ATOMIC BOMB
IN WoaLD PosIrTcs (948); INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY, GROWnT OF A POLICY (U. S.
Dep't State, 1946), and POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS (1948).
The important point is not whether a proposed agreement interferes in the relations between a state
and its citizens, but whether the objectives of the parties, considering the whole context in which they
find themselves, require such interference. If it is necessary to the adequate protection of human rights
and to security to require states to assume obligations with respect to their own citizens, such action is no
less rational and no more contrary to international law than the proposed inspection system for atomic
energy.
1 5 5 JEssu,, op. cit. supra note 142, 26, 91.
For clarity of thinking it is necessary to observe a distinction between binding obligation as between
nations under international law and the internal or domestic effects of an agreement as a "part of the
law of the land." To establish binding international obligation it is not necessary to establish that the
terms of the United Nations Charter are sufficiently precise and "self-executing" to become the law
THE RIGHTS OF MAN IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY
Similarly, Professor Lauterpacht insists that the human rights provisions of the
Charter are not "mere embellishment of an historic document' but rather consti-
tute binding legal obligation, recognizing "fundamental rights of the individual in-
dependent of the law of his state." "The Charter of the United Nations is," he writes,
"a legal document; its language is the language of law, of international law. In
affirming repeatedly the 'fundamental human rights' of the individual, it must of
necessity be deemed to refer to legal rights-to legal rights recognized by inter-
national law and independent of the law of the State."' 55 It is, therefore, the task
and opportunity of the proposed new agreements, not to innovate in principle, but
to translate obligation already assumed into concrete detail in the practice of states.
Though irrelevant to establishing the unimpaired power of nation-states to make
new agreements about human rights, the practice of the various organs of the
United Nations under the Charter during the past four years is relevant as evidence
of the common consensus of mankind that all peoples everywhere are interdependent
as to human rights and security' 56 Contrary to the broad interpretation favored
of the land, without further legislative implementation. What agreements, in the absence of a clear ex-
pression of intent, are or are not "self-executing" under our law is still a matter of speculation and
controversy. Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing, 2o Am. J. INT'L L. 444 (1926); Henry,
When Is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 Micm. L. REv. 776 (1929). It may be observed, however, that
a promise to promote respect for and observance of human rights and freedom is not, under common
sense interpretation, compatible with insistence upon the maintenance of internal doctrines and practices
destructive of human rights and freedom and violent opposition to all change. The declarations of
the framers of the Charter at San Francisco are, moreover, instructive. On the necessity for including
the maintenance of human rights under the Charter, the official record states:
"There was considerable discussion .. .of this point, with emphasis on the idea that respect for
human rights should also be mentioned in Chapter II ["Principles," now Chapter I] as a principle to
be observed by all members. It was felt that if this statement were included only in Chapter I ["Pur-
poses," now Chapter I], it would bind only the Organization and would relieve member governments
from the obligation to respect the fundamental freedoms of individuals within their own countries."
Committee I/i, 6 DocmtErs oF TE UNiTD NArIONS CONFE~RENCE OF INTERNA-ONoAL OsctGANZArsou,
SAN FRA.clsco, 1945 291 (1945). (Italics supplied.)
Four justices of the Supreme Court have, further, indicated a sense of obligation to take into account
the policy embodied in the United Nations Charter in decisions about human rights. Justice Black, with
whom Justice Douglas agreed, concurred in the California Alien Land Law case, Oyama v. California,
332 U. S. 633 (1948), declaring that one of the reasons why the law is bad is that "we have recently
pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations to 'promote . . . universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion.' [citing the Charter, Articles 55C and 56] How can this nation be faithful to this inter-
national pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are
permitted to be enforced?" Id. at 649-650. And in the concurring opinion of Justice Murphy, who was
joined by Justice Rutledge: "The Alien Land Law stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of that national
pledge. Its inconsistency with the Charter, which has been duly ratified and adopted by the United
States, is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned." Id. at 673.
Compare the companion Canadian case, In re Drummond Wren, 4 D. L R. 674 (1945).
For telling argument that the United Nations obligations are already "the law of the land," see Sayre,
Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law, 34 IowA L. Rxv. 1 (1948), and United Nations Law, 25
CAN. BAR. REv. 809 (1947).
'
5 4 See Human Rights in THE IwrERNATioNAL LAw AssociAToN, REPORT OF TE FORTY-SacoND CON-
FERENCE, PRAGUS, 1947 13, r4-I5 (1948).
... Lauterpacht, supra note 149, at ior, 102.
"
5 5 Further evidence of the concern of the peoples of the world for human rights may be found
in the Draft Declaration on Rights and Dudes of States, just completed by the International Law Com-
mission of the United Nations for submission to the General Assembly. Article 6 of this draft reads,
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by the bar leaders, Article 2(7) has proved little impediment to the competence of
United Nations organs to take action in a number of situations which might from
isolationist perspectives be regarded as involving "essentially" domestic questions.6 7
Thus, in the Spanish case in 1946 both the Security Council and the General As-
sembly took jurisdiction of questions about the nature of the Spanish government.
In the view of the majority of the Council the Franco regime was regarded as likely
to endanger international peace and security within the meaning of Article 34, a
fact that called for action by the Council under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of
Disputes).' In reply to the objection that Article 2, paragraph 7, prohibited such
action Dr. Evatt (an enthusiastic supporter of a broad scope for Article 2(7) at
San Francisco) .. explained:
Then, I return to the object of the action in order to demonstrate that this matter is
not essentially one of domestic concern. The object is to remove a danger to international
peace and a cause of international friction .... The argument, therefore, that the United
Nations and the Security Council or any other Members of the United Nations, cannot
touch this matter, because it merely affects internal affairs in Spain is unsubstantial and
should be rejected.160
And again:
If the facts indicate that that regime, by its nature, by its conduct, by its operation
is likely to interfere with international peace and likely to be a menace to its neighbors,
then the existence of 'that regime is no longer a matter of essentially domestic juris-
diction.16 1
The General Assembly on its part was even more emphatic. In support of a
resolution adopted barring Spain from membership in the United Nations and
recommending withdrawal of ambassadors, M. Alfaro of Panama stated:
But the dogma of non-intervention has nothing to do with the great system of col-
"Every state has the duty to treat all persons under its jurisdiction with respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
Mr. Koretsky (Soviet Union) and Judge Hudson (United States) voted against the draft declaration.
According to Sohn, The Development of International Law, 35 A.B.A.J. 688, 689 (1949): "Judge Hudson
stated that he voted against the Draft Declaration because the provisions of its Article 6 went beyond
the Charter of the United Nations and beyond international law at its present stage of development." It
may be noted that Judge Hudson stood alone on this point and be re-emphasized that, whatever existing
doctrine, there is no doctrine to preclude states from making new agreements.
1 See FNcH , op. cit. supra note 115, at 103-r4o for a convenient summary.
.
5 Id. at 1o8-113; GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 115, at 115.
... See 6 DocuMENTs osp THE UNITED NAI-ONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANZATION, SA
FRANCIscO, 1945 436 et seq. (1945). Dr. Evatt is responsible for the present limitation of the exception
within Article 2, paragraph 7, namely, that authorization of intervention by the organization in cases
arising under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to threats to the Peace, breaches of the Peace, and acts
of Aggression)--see the final phrase of Art. 2(7)-is limited to cases where enforcement measures under
that Chapter are required.
... Journal of the Security Council No. 37 at 278, 279 (947); quoted in FINfCHAM, op. cit. stipra note
II5, at IIO-iii.
.
6 Id. at No. 39 at 767, quoted in FsNcIN Am, op. cit. supra note i15, at 113-114. No resolution was
adopted, however, despite approval by the Council, because the permanent members could not agree
on a text. GooDsaCH AND HAMERO, op. cit. supra note 115, at xx5.
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lective action that we set up by the Charter at San Francisco. Arbitrary intervention
infringes upon the principles of independence. Collective action is based on the doctrine
of interdependence. Collective action is foreseen, authorized, and agreed upon in
specific provisions of the Charter, and it is indispensable for the United Nations to
exert, because without collective action we cannot have peace and security, we cannot
promote human rights, we cannot have disarmament, we cannot make the trusteeship
regime work, we cannot have international co-operation, we cannot accomplish any of
the great, vital, basic principles, for which we have organized the world community of
States....
To invoke Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter against this resolution is to miss the
point entirely. We are not dealing here with any matter essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of Spain. We are making recommendations that concern only the individual
sovereignty of the Members of the United Nations, because each nation is absolutely
free to maintain or not to maintain ambassadors or ministers in any given country. I
will conclude by stating that situations that are an actual or potential danger to the
peace of the world, and constitute a continuous, notorious, grave and shocking violation'
of the most elementary human rights, are not matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any particular State; they are essenti ally within international jurisdiction,
essentially within the powers and duties of the United Nations.
162
Likewise in the South African case the General Assembly assumed its competence
and took jurisdiction, despite the objection that alleged discriminatory treatment of
Indian immigrants by the Union of South Africa, in respect to suffrage and land
tenure, was a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of that country' 3
When both the form of government of a state and internal discriminations are re-
garded as of "international concern" rather than of "domestic jurisdiction," it needs
no emphasis that "domestic jurisdiction" is a concept of dwindling proportions.
Further illustration could be offered by reference to the Greek and Indonesian
cases.'04 Whatever the actual facts of world-wide interdependence, it is clear that
the representatives of the peoples assembled in the United Nations regard the hu-
man rights and security of all peoples as indivisible. It is difficult to believe that so
many observers, from such different vantage points around the world and repre-
senting such diverse cultures, can all be be wrong.
V
The second major charge of the bar leaders that United States' participation in
the United Nations program is unconstitutional as beyond the scope of the treaty
or other federal power is equally without merit. Both Supreme Court opinion and
the opinion of leading publicists make it clear, on the contrary, that our participa-
tion is well within the scope of the treaty and other federal power.
Undefined in the Constitution itself, the treaty power has always been regarded
as sufficiently broad and expansible to cover all matters of genuine international
... Journal of the United Nations, No. 6o, Supplement A-A/Pv/59, at 556 (1946); quoted in
FINcHAM, op. cit. supra note 115, at 138.
"'See FINcHAr, op. cit. supra note I15, at 117-135; Gross, Impact of the United Nations Upon
Domestic Jurisdiction, 18 DEP'r STAT BuLL. 259, 263-264 (1948).
.' See FIcN.AM, op. cit. stupra note 115, at 104-107, 114-117; Gross, supra note 163, at 262.
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concern, under whatever conditions a changing world context may impose. No
treaty has ever been held unconstitutional,"oa and it is the general consensus that
outside of certain wide limitations there is no subject about which a treaty may
not be made.' The prevailing interpretation of the several relevant clauses of
the Constitution'1 7 was most clearly expounded by the Supreme Court in a famous
passage in Geofroy v. Riggs in i89o:9'
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except
by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the govern-
ment or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself
and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize
what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that
of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter without its
consent.... But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to the
questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject of
negotiations with a foreign country.' 6 9
It is immediately apparent that the limitations as to agreements which seek basically
to change the Constitution or "authorize what the Constitution forbids" are not
relevant to the present question. Only the grossest distortion of perspectives could
envisage the human rights program as interfering, for example, with a republican
form of government 70 or seeking to establish a religion. The only relevant limita-
.. See DEYLiN, THE TRaY POWER UNDER THE CoNs-ItroO OF THE UNITED STATES 28 §3 (9O8).
...See Feidler and Dwan, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power, 28 GEo. L. J. x84 (x939); Burr,
Treaty-Making Power, 51 PRoc. AM. PIL. Soc'Y 271 (1912); Butler, Limitations of the Treaty.Making
Power of the United States in Matters Coming Within the Jurisdiction of the States, 23 Puoc. AM. Socy
INT'L L. 176 (1929); Hughes, id. at 194; Boyd, The Expanding Treaty-Power, 6 N. C. L. REV. 428 (1928);
Lenoir, Treaties and the Supreme Court, I U. or Cm. L. Rv. 602 (1934); Kuhn, The Treaty-Making
Power and the Reserved Sovereignty of the States, 7 COL. L. REV. 172 (1907); Magnusson, Our Member-
ship in the United Nations and the Federal Treaty-Power Under the Constitution, 34 VA. L. Rae. 137
(1948); Hudson, The Treaty-Making Power of the Vnited States in Connection with the Manufacture of
Arms and Ammunition, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 736 (1934); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CoNSI0srrnON AND
WORLo ORGANIZATION (1944); NATIONAL SUPREMACY VERSUS STATE POWER (1913); TOTAL 'WAR AND
Ta CONSTITUTION c. 4 (947); 1 W. W. WILOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§215 (1910); 2 JoSEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIEs ON THE CONSTITUTION OF ma UNITED STATES §x5o8 (3rd
ed. 1858); ABAAMa WEINFELD, LABOR TREATIES AND LABOR COMPACTS (r937); 2 CHARLES H. BUTLER,
TREATY-MAKING POWER OF TH UNra STATES (1902); 2 CHAS. C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY
AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY Tm UNITED STATES 139r (2d rev. ed. 1945).
Legislation enacted pursuant to the treaty-power and co-extensive with it is covered by the same rule.
Where a treaty is validly made "there can be no question whether the subsequent legislation to carry out
the treaty is constitutional." Feidler and Dwan, supra note 166, at x97; see Anderson, Extent and iami-
tations of the Treaty Power, x Am. J. INT'L L. 636, 657 (1907); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 46, 432
(1920); Neely v. Henkel, 18o U. S. 1o9 (go1).
.. The important grants of power are of course Art. II, Sec. 2, Par. 2, which reads:
"He [the President] shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur . . ." and Art. VI, Par. 2, which reads:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and
all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
lag 133 U. S. 258 (890) (Treaty of I8N3 with France permitting aliens to inherit property, held
superior to contrary law of Maryland, which was applicable in the District of Columbia where case arose).
... Id. at 267.
10 Butler, Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power of the United States in Matters Coming Within
the Jurisdiction of the States, 23 PRoc. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 176, 178 (1929).
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don (beyond the safeguards of the Fifth Amendment, to be discussed below) is that
which limits the subject matter of a treaty to questions "that properly pertain to
our foreign relations.""'  Chief Justice Hughes expressed this point succinctly:
It seems to me that, whatever doubt there may originally have been or may yet linger
in some minds in regard to the scope of the treaty-making power, so far as it relates to
the external concerns of the nation there is no question for discussion. I think it per-
fectly idle to consider that the Supreme Court would ever hold that any treaty made in
a constitutional manner in relation to external concerns of the nation is beyond the
power of the sovereignty of the United States or invalid under the Constitution of the
United States where no express prohibition of the Constitution has been violated. 17
The still leading case on the scope of the treaty power is Missouri v. Holland,173 hold-
ing that the treaty power may be extended even beyond the limits of the powers
expressly delegated to the Congress, when those powers are too narrowly construed
to permit effective action on matters of national interest and international concern.
The decision in this case sustained an act of Congress, adopted under the "necessary
and proper" clause, to implement a treaty made with Great Britain for the pro-
tection of migratory birds traveling between the United States and Canada. Two
lower courts had held unconstitutional an earlier act of Congress, not in aid of a
treaty but designed to secure the same end. 74 Speaking for the Court, Justice
Holmes said:
Whether the two cases cited were decided rightly or not they cannot be accepted
as a test of the treaty power. Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only
when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when
made under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the
authority of the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the
convention. We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-
making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there
may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of
Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is
not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, "a power which
must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government" is not to be
found.... [W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being
the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of
its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an
1 Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U. S. 30, 40 (1931). Cf. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 341
(1923); Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 243 (U. S. 1872).
... Hughes, supra note 166, at 194. (Italics supplied.) For other authorities adhering to the same
view see: EDWA D S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SuPREMACY VEssus STATE POWER (1913); Burr, supra note
166, at 285. judge Hudson states:
"... it is essential that within very wide limits the Government of the United States should have
power to do by treaty what is thought to be for the interests of the United States, and no construction
of the Constitution which would deprive it of such power is to be tolerated."
Hudson, supra, note x66, at 738.
173 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
1"4 See United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed.
154 (E. D. Ark. 1914).
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organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to
prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of
our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. The
treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Consti-
tution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from
the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has
become in deciding what that Amendment has reserved .... No doubt the great body
of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override
its power. . .. Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved.
It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power.175
What is of "external" or "international" concern, it may be added, need not be ex-
clusively so. In many instances, if not in most, there is a concurrence of interest
which has both domestic and foreign application. Local matters can, as in the
Holland case they did, become as Hughes suggests "so related to international mat-
ters that an international regulation could not appropriately succeed without em-
bracing local affairs as well."17
6
It may reasonably be assumed that what are matters of international concern for
determining the scope of the treaty power is in the last analysis a question, not of
derivation from authoritative doctrine, but of fact and of contemporary fact. The
concern of the peoples of the world for human rights and the international char-
acter of such rights for the purposes of international law have already been sufficient-
ly demonstrated. Nothing in the context of the creation of our Constitution or in
the subsequent history of our constitutional development offers any barrier to the
conclusion that human rights are equally of international concern for exercise of
the treaty power. The constitutional framers plainly foresaw the possibilities of
unanticipated development in the scope of the treaty power, as Madison's reluctance
to specify its content shows:
The object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations and is external.
I do not think it possible to enumerate all the cases in which such external regulations
would be necessary. Would it be right to define all the cases in which Congress could
exercise this authority? The definition might and probably would be defective. They
might be restrained by such a definition from exercising the authority where it could
be essential to the interest and safety of the community. It is most safe, therefore, to
leave it to be exercised as contingencies may arise.177
It is both certain that the framers could not have foreseen as the subject of treaties
such items as patents, copyrights, health, drugs, labor relations, commercial aviation,
armaments, and a host of matters which have become questions of international con-
cern since 1787,178 and equally clear from Madison's remarks that they did not see
"external" matters as a fixed and unalterable category. And if this category was not
175252 U. S. 416, 433-434, 435 (1920).
... Hughes, supra note x66, at 195; see also Feidler and Dwan, supra note 166, at z95.
1773 ELLor's DEBATES 5r4 (2d. ed. 1836-z866) (Italics supplied); see DEVLIN, op. d. supra note
165, at x28.
... See WEIN'ELD, op. cit supra note r66, at 25; also Comment, Treaties and the Constitttion: Alien
Property Rights, 37 CoL. L. REV. 1361 (I937).
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intended to be fixed, and has not proved to be so in practice, "then it is obvious"
as one authority points out "that the limits of the [treaty] power are coeval and
coterminous with the increasing and expanding nature of the relations between
nations."' 7  In the face of world problems and interdependences involving every
aspect of human activity to a degree unimagined even a few years ago, it seems
unreal and foolish-even dangerous-to rest any question of fact or policy on a view
which holds that the migration of birds can be a matter of international concern,
but that the liberty and welfare of human beings cannot.
It is now generally agreed, as indicated by Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Hol-
land,80 that the scope of the treaty power is in no way limited by the powers other-
wise reserved by the Constitution to the states or by any "invisible radiation from
the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."' 8 On no point have the Supreme
Court and leading authorities been more emphatic. "The powers of the states ...
set no limit to the treaty-making power."' 2 The celebrated case of Ware v. Hyl-
ton,'8 3 which held the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain in 1783 paramount to a
Virginia statute discharging debts due British subjects, speaks with unusual authority
since one of the justices had been a member of the Federal Convention and another
of a State Convention adopting the Federal Constitution. 8 4 Speaking for the Court
Justice Chase laid down the rule which with only inconsequential deviation 8 5 has
continued to the present day:
It seems to me that treaties made by congress according to the confederation, were
superior to the laws of the States; because the confederation made them obligatory on all
the States....
[But] if doubts could exist before the establishment of the present national govern-
ment, they must be entirely removed by the sixth article of the constitution which pro-
vides "that all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land... ." It is the declared will of the people
of the United States that every treaty made by the authority of the United States shall
be superior to the constitution and laws of any individual state; and their will alone is to
decide.'8 0
The subjects covered in application of this principle have repeatedly extended to
matters ordinarily left to regulation by the states. In addition to abrogation of
debts in the case just mentioned these include: tide to land, 8 7 escheat and inheri-
19 Boyd, supra note 166 at 441. .. Suprs note x73. 181 Id. at 434.
182 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTtrnoN AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 101 (Ioth ed. 1948).
183 3 Dall. igg (U. S. 1796). Cf. Clarke v. Harwood, 3 Dall. 343 (U. S. 1797).
... These were Justice Wilson and Justice Iredell. See Butler, supra note 870, at 879.
1"' Arising from concern for slave-holding interests, the doctrine that the scope of the treaty-power
could not extend to matters reserved to the states, was put forward as dicta by Chief Justice Taney in
Provost v. Greneaux, 89 How. I (U. S. 8856) (treaty with France held intended not to supersede
Louisiana state succession tax law). See EDwAu S. CORWIN, THE COssrntroN AND WORLD ORGANIZA-
-ON 13-84 (1944); 2 WILLOUGHBY, op. ct. supra note x66, sees. 213-215. For authority overruling this
decision see cases cited infra note I88. Cf. 2 WILLOUGHBY, sees. 214-215.
1863 DalI. 899, at 236, 237 (U. S. 1796).
... Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (U. S. 83) (involving title under Virginia
law as opposed to Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain). Cf. Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. 489, 496 (U. S.
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tance, 88 statute of limitations,"8 9 local taxation, 90 administration of alien estates,
0 1
prohibition against employment of foreign labor,1"2 and the limitation of pawn-
brokerage to citizens.0 3 Nor is the predilection for national supremacy confined
to federal courts. State courts also have presented and rejected the states-rights
argument.' 9' The contention that most of these subjects have involved aliens and
thus form a particular category of state-supervised activity has little merit in the
face of Missouri v. Holland,"5 which made applicable to American citizens regula-
tions respecting the preservation of birds. And there is no need to suppose the end
of this development has been reached. Many years ago Professor Borchard observed:
It is within the power of the federal government by treaty to remove from state
control any matter which may become the subject of negotiation with a foreign govern-
ment. With the continued drawing together of the world by increased facilities for
travel and communication, the subjects of common interest which require international
regulation will continue to grow in extent and variety. Uniformity of legislation by
withdrawal from state legislative control of such subjects as marriage and divorce, labor
legislation, the ownership and inheritance of property, and all matters affecting aliens
would be possible by the exertion of the necessary federal treaty power.1 0
Only the narrowest perspective could except the human rights program from the
scope otherwise so broadly conceived.
Coming explicitly to the Tenth Amendment, it is clear that this famous consti-
tutional truism imposes no limit on the treaty power. Nowhere in the constitutional
debates, either federal or state, is there any indication that such limitation was con-
templated. As Burr points out:
The very language of the amendment would seem to establish this fact. What are the
powers reserved to the States thereby? "The powers" first, says the amendment, "not
delegated to the United States," and second, adds the amendment, not "prohibited by it"
1824) (Kentucky statute barring alien land holding); Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New
Haven, 8 Wheat. 464 (U. S. 1823). See for these and the following eases, notes infra 188-193, Feidler
and Dvan, supra note i66; ABAaHum WEINFELD, LABOR TREATIES AND LABOR COmAts'rs 14 el seq.
(1937); Kuhn, supra note 166.
... Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259 (U. S. 1817) (Maryland escheat law abrogated by treaty with
France); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 (1879) (common law and statutory law of Virginia
overruled by Swiss Treaty of i85o); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U. S. 30 (1931) (treaty with Persia
and New York escheat law).
" Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch 454 (U. S. i8o6) (Virginia statute of limitations).
'
9 0 Neilsen v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 47 (929) (1826 Treaty with Denmark superior to Iowa tax law).
1.1 These are the consular cases. See e.g., In re Faltosini, 67 N. Y. Supp. 1119 (19oo); In re
Lobrasciano, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1040 (I9O2); Wyman v. McEvoy, 191 Mass. 276, 77 N. E. 379 (19o6).
See Kuhn, supra note 166, at i8o. For a more recent discussion of the cases see Comment, Treaties and
the Constitution: Alien Property Rights, 37 COL. L. Rav. 1361 (937). Cf. Rocca v. Thompson, 223
U. S. 317, 330-331 (1912), holding that although it was within the power of the national government
to confer the exclusive right of administration of alien intestate estates on consuls, the words of a particu-
lar treaty might not require the contravention of state law. See Comment, supra, at 1367-1368.
... Baker v. City of Portland, .2 Fed. Cas. 472, No. 777 (C. C. D. Ore. 1879).
... Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332 (1924) (involving treaty of 19ix with Japan).
... Especially Opel v. Shoup, ioo Iowa 407, 420 (1896); see Kuhn, supra note 166, at 18o, n. I.
... Supra note 173.
19. Comment, Treaty-Making Power as Support for Federal Legislation, 29 YALE L. J. 445, 449
(I920).
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[the Constitution] to the States. Now, by the Constitution the power to make treaties
is specifically granted to the Federal government in the Second Section of the Second
Article, and specifically prohibited to the States by the Tenth Section of the First
Article. . . . The reserved rights of the States are necessarily and by virtue of the very
words of the Tenth Amendment, those rights which remain after the grant, first, of the
treaty-making power, and second, of the power of Congress to legislate upon certain
subjects. The Tenth Amendment, therefore, leaves the treaty-making power of the
United States unaltered and precisely as granted by the Constitution.
19 7
The cases, already referred to, holding treaties superior to state law confirm this
position. If, as has been held, the Tenth Amendment is merely "declaratory" and
of no effect as to a bar to broad congressional powers under the commerce clause, 9s
it has even less cause to be revived in order to cut down the treaty power. The
conclusion is thus inevitable: the Amendment is wholly immaterial, both as to the
provisions of treaties themselves and to the legislation supplementing them' 9
The wisdom of the conclusion that state power does not restrict treaty power
is demonstrated by a glance at the alternative. "Were it true," it is suggested, "that
the United States could not enter into treaties affecting matters understood to be
generally reserved to the States ... the result would be an intolerable restriction upon
the power of a sovereign nation.120 0  The United States would not in fact be
sovereign in the sense of having real power to protect itself in world affairs, a point
which Justice Holmes emphasized in Missouri v. Holland in urging that "it is
not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a power which
must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to be
found."2
0
'
It is, if possible, even more firmly established that the scope of the treaty power
is not limited by the powers otherwise delegated by the Constitution to the whole
Congress. Though the treaty-power and the delegated and inherent powers of
Congress frequently refer to the same events in our international affairs they are
concurrent, not conflicting 20 It is suggested by Professor Corwin that the power
" Burr, supra note 166, at 362-363.
... Speaking for the Court in United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (940), which overruled
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (i918), Justice Stone stated:
"The amendment states but a truism that all is retained vhich has not been surrendered. There is
nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship be-
tween the national and state governments as it has been established by the constitution before the
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might
seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their
reserved powers. . . . From the beginning and for many years the amendment has been construed
as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted
power which are appropriate and plainly adopted to the permitted end."
See Feller, The Tenth Amendment Retires, 27 A. B. A. J. 223 (1941); Comment, 37 COL. L. Rav.
1361, 1362 (937).
100 See note 166 supra. ... Note, 33 HARv. L. REv. 281, 287 (1919).
2012 52 U. S. 416, 433 (192o). For further comment on this point see EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE
CoNsaTr oN AND WORLD ORGANIZAION 14-15 (1944); Hughes, supra note 166, at 194; Butler, supra
note 170, at 178.
202 See Burr, supra note 166, at 306; Kuhn, supra note 166, at 183; 5 JOHN B. MOORE, INTERNA-TONAL
LAw Dzosr 164 (19o6). The cases are collected in ABaAHaM WEINFELD, LABOR TREATIS AND LABOR
CoMuPACrs 25 et seq. (1937).
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to appropriate money and possibly to incorporate territory are exceptions.203  But
with that question we need not concern ourselves here, neither problem having rele-
vance to the human rights program. It is sufficient to note that treaties have dealt
again and again with subjects otherwise delegated to Congress. Witness, for example,
the array of agreements, which might otherwise be regulated under the commerce
power, affecting customs duties and regulating commerce.20 4 Treaties have also
extended to copyrights, naval armament, and taxation, each of which equally com-
ports with a specifically granted congressional power.2 0 5 That there is no conflict is
evidenced in the unquestioned rule of law that treaties may supersede prior con-
gressional acts. On this point it was stated in Foster v. Neilson,... a case involving
the validity of the Spanish grants in West Florida and the effect to be given to the
Treaty of 18i9 with Spain: "Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the
land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in Courts of Justice as equivalent to an act
of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision. '2°7 This is not to say that the converse is not also true, that an act of
Congress of later date may not override, from the point of view of domestic law, the
provisions of a treaty. 08 But this fact is irrelevant to the question of limitation of
the treaty power; it is only concerned with the termination of individual rights
cteated by treaty and, moreover, as to that termination extends only to the internal
domestic effectiveness, since no congressional act can abrogate a treaty in terms of
international obligation.2 °9 It has no bearing on the scope of subjects which a treaty
may embrace, nor on the international effectiveness of such a treaty. Speaking of
the Chinese Exclusion case, 10 which concerned just such an abrogation by act of
Congress of the Treaty of I881 with China, Burr remarks:
Yet nowhere creeps in a suggestion that the provisions of the treaties with China dealing
with and regulating commerce and immigration, are ineffective as laws; indeed, the
cases are suffused with the light of the contrary assumption and constitute direct and
203EDWARDI S. CoRwiN, NArToNAl. SUPREMACY VERSUS SrAT POWER 9-13 (913).
", Cf. Commercial aviation, trade-marks, agriculture, trade in dangerous drugs, traffic in women,
to list a few. See WEINFELD, op. cit. supra note 166, at 5; CoIwvnu, op. cit. supra note 203, at xi, and
cases therein cited: McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements:
Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L. J. 18o, 273-278 (1945). On this point Burr
remarks:
"Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has spoken so often, so uniformly, so positively, upon the question
discussed in the preceding cases, it would seem almost a work of super-erogation to inquire how many
treaties have been made regulating commerce, and put into effect without any act of Congress." Burr,
supra note 166, at 322.2
a See WEINFELD, op. cit. supra note 166, at 5, 30.
202 Pet. 253 (U. S. 1829).
7 Id. at 314.
"'Two Hundred and Seven Half Pound Papers of Smoking Tobacco, etc. v. United States, xx Wall.
616 (U. S. 1870); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190 (1887); Edyc v. Robertson, 112 U. S. 423
(1884).
20 See Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International Relations: Three Recent
Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CALiF. L. REv. 643, 656-661 (937). Compare Jones, Constitutional Linita-
lions on the Treaty-Making Power, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 462 (941), which deals with the international
aspects of the problem.
2.0 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581 (z888).
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positive decisions recognizing and establishing the efficacy of treaty provisions propriore
vigore.211
From the preponderance of cases in this vein and of like authoritative opinions it is
clear that congressional powers impose no constitutional bar to the protection of
human rights through the treaty power.
A very good case can indeed be made for the converse proposition that the treaty
power imposes no limits on the powers of the whole Congress and that there exists
through a combination of the powers of the Congress and the President a plenary
federal power over foreign affairs which offers a procedure, completely interchange-
able with and alternative to the treaty, for the making and implementation of inter-
national agreements2 2 It is not disputed today that the President has exclusive
control over the actual conduct of all negotiations with other nations and that he
is the appropriate authority to make final utterance of an agreement as the inter-
national obligation of the United States.2 3 It is likewise clear that the whole Con-
gress has wide powers, granted by the express terms of the Constitution and exercised
in hundreds of instances since the beginning of our history, to frame policies to guide
the President in his conduct of negotiations and to validate agreements negotiated by
him as the law of the land. 1
The Congress has broad powers "to . . . provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States,"21 "to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States,"210 to define and punish . . . offenses against the
law of nations,"21 7 "to declare war, ' ' ms "to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any depart-
211 Burr, supra note 166, at 318.
'
1
"For 250 pages of documentation of the general point, see McDougal and Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy,
54 YALE L. J. 181, 534 (945). See also EDwxAD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WoRLD ORGANIZA-
TIONs 8 (1944); WALLACE M. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTs; DEMOCRATIC PRO-
CEDURE UNDER THE CoSrtrIToN OF THE UNITED STATES (194r); Wright, The United States and Inter-
national Agreements, 38 Am. J. INT'L L. 341 (944); Dickey, Our Treaty Procedure Versus Our Foreign
Policies, 25 FOREIGN AFFAIRS I (1947).
"'
5McDougal and Lans, supra note 212, at 244 et seq.; Wright, supra note 212, at 355.
11' McDougal and Lans, supra note 212, at 238 et seq.; Hackworth, Legal Aspects of the Trade Agree-
ments of Z934, 21 A. B. A. J. 570 (r935).
""U. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8, par. I.
... Id. par. 3. It may be noted that the Supreme Court did not hold in Missouri v. Holland, supra
note 173, that the commerce power did not extend to regulating the flight of birds. It assumed the point
arguendo. justice Holmes' dictum that the treaty power might extend beyond the scope of the powers
expressly delegated to the Congress was uttered before the Court had officially declared the Tenth Amend-
ment a truism for all purposes, before the Court had reverted to the early broad interpretations of
the commerce power, and before the doctrine of "inherent powers" had received its present broad
application to agreements other than treaties. It is not to be expected that future courts will regard a
dictum uttered in such a context as imposing any serious limit on the powers of the Congress. For dis-
cussion, see McDougal and Lans, supra note 212 at 285.
217 Id. par. io.
... Id. par. ii.
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ment or officer thereof,"21  and, hence, to implement the Bill-of-Rights220 amend-
ments to the Constitution; and these powers are coming to be more and more
broadly construed as the exigencies of the nation require. Thus, the war power is
held not restricted to "the winning of victories in the field and the repulse of enemy
forces," but to extend to "every matter so related to war as substantially to affect its
conduct and progress."22' Embracing the daily intricacies of the national economy,
this power has been invoked to sustain as late as in 1948 the Housing and Rent Act
of 1947 on the ground that war does not end with the cessation of hostilities. Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court, in Justice Murphy's words, now insists "that the federal
commerce power is as broad as the needs of the nation" and that it cannot "deny
that Congress can effectively deal with problems concerning the welfare of the
national economy." 2 2 The foreign commerce clause shares this broad construction
and has been held to sustain tariff duties which could not be upheld under the tax
power. Speaking for a unanimous court in this case, University of Illinois v.
United States,2  Justice Hughes commented: "In international relations and with
respect to foreign intercourse and trade, the people of the United States act through
a single government with unified and adequate national power."224 The power of
Congress to control aliens, though not a specifically delegated power, charts the same
course. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,25 Justice Gray upheld deportation of
aliens at the option of Congress saying:
The United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are vested by the Consti-
tution with the entire control of international relations, and with all the powers of gov-
ernment necessary to maintain that control and make it effective. The only government
of this country, which other nations recognize or treat with, is the Government of the
Union ... ma
And more recently a Pennsylvania statute which sought to regulate aliens was
held unconstitutional, as a violation of the principle of supremacy 27  "The
supremacy of the national power," said Justice Black for the Court, "in the general
field of foreign affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization and de-
portation, is made clear by the Constitution, was pointed out by the authors of
The Federalist in 1787, and has since been given continuous recognition by this
Court."
2 2 8
Supplementing these powers of the Congress, the powers of the President as "the
Executive,"229 as "the Commander-in-Chief of the the Army and Navy,"' " etc.,
2
.Id. par. I8.
.2 For the broad federal powers over civil rights and liberties which can be used to authorize inter-
national agreements see infra, Section VI. THE PRESIDENT'S COMIIITEE ON CIVIL RiGHTs, To SEcuR
TkEms RsGns 107 (1947) offers a survey of the relevant constitutional powers.
.2 Chief Justice Stone for the Court in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 8s, 93 (1942).
222 American Power and Light Co. v. S. E. C., 329 U. S. 90, 103 (1946).
2 289 U. S. 48 (1933). ' Id. at 59.
222 149 U. S. 698 (1893). 2201d . at 711.
2 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1940). 2 2 8 Id. at 62.
22. U. S. CONsr. Art. II, §, par. 1. 2 0 Id. §I, par. I.
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and as agent for Congress, make up a full complement of powers adequate to
deal with all phases of international life. Independent of Congress, the President
may negotiate agreements with foreign nations within the scope of his own delegated
powers,23 ' while as agent for Congress, under its powers as recited above, it has
been customary for the President since i792 to negotiate international agreements on
a great range of important topics of ever increasing variety2  How far the powers
of the President alone extend, it is not necessary to speculate; it is sufficient for present
purposes that the powers of Congress when conjoined with those of the President
are plenary.
To augment the express powers of the Congress and the President, to close any
conceivable gaps, and hence to insure the plenary character of these powers in any
eventuality, there is available a well-established doctrine, the doctrine of "inherent
powers" in international affairs, which "has had a long and honorable history of
effective work in the national interest,"233 and which in one form or another is
subscribed to by most commentators on the Constitution.2 3 4  The most famous re-
cent exposition of this doctrine is that of Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court,
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation Upholding the power of the
President to impose by proclamation, pursuant to a Joint Resolution of Congress, an
embargo on the shipment of arms, Justice Sutherland clarified the difference be-
tween federal powers in the domestic and in the international field, saying? 35"
The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their origin and their
nature. The broad statement that the Federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are neces-
sary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in
respect of our internal affairs....
It results that the investment of the Federal government with the powers of external
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers
"' See McDougal and Lans, supra note 212, at 246-252. Cf. United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S.
324 (1937).
... See B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 583 (1912); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892);
Hampton and Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928). McDougal and Lans, supra note 212, at 252-
254, 273 et seq. In addition to commercial agreements some of the subjects covered are acquisition of
territory, settlement of international claims, adherence to international organizations (see I. L. 0., Uni-
versal Postal Unions, International Penal Prison Commission, UNRRA, Bretton Woods, etc.), and inter-
national financial and war debt agreements. Id. at 261-263, 278-282.
... MeDougal and Lans, supra note 212, at 255.
If it be suggested that this completely comprehensive power of the Federal Government over foreign
affairs can exhaust itself through the treaty power, Professor Corwin in THE CONSTrITUION AND WoRnD
ORGANIZATION 19 (944) answers:
"As a matter of history the notion of the indefinite scope of the treaty-making power is itself reflective
of the concept of the National Government's plenary powers in the field of foreign relation and was not
always conceded in earlier days."
2" For the semantic equivalence of doctrines of "implied powers" and "constructive powers," with
citation to various authorities, see McDougal and Lans, supra note 212, at 256 et seq. See also EDwARD S.
CoRwim, THE CoNSTrrTUnON AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 17-20 (1944), THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND
PowEns 209-211 (3rd rev. ed. 1948); Culp, Executive Power in Emergencies, 31 MICH. L. Rav. xi62
(93).233 299 U. S. 304 (936). 1551 ld. at 318.
526 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic
relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution,
would have vested in the Federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.
Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign
territory unless in respect of our own citizens .. . ; and operations of the national in such
territory must be governed by treaties, international understandings and compacts, and
the principles of international law. As a member of the family of nations, the right and
power of the United States in that field are equal to the right and power of the other
members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely
sovereign. The power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation, (Jones v. United
States, 137 U. S. 202, 212), the power to expel undesirable aliens (Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U. S. 698, 705 et seq.), the power to make such international agree-
ments as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense (Altman & Co. v. United
States, 224 U. S. 583, 6oo, 6oi; Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement, 2d
ed., p. 102 and note i), none of which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution, never-
theless exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality.
From this decision and others it is clear that neither the doctrine of enumerated
powers nor the separation of powers2 30 doctrine has the slightest force in impeding
the comprehensive and effective cooperation of the President and Congress in the
field of international relations.
37
In the light of these facts, it may be concluded that the United States has a
choice of procedural alternatives-treaty or congressional-executive agreement, and
each fully competent-for implementing its participation in the human rights pro-
gram. As emphasized by Professor Garner, Reporter for the Harvard Research
Draft of the Law of Treaties, any particular choice between these alternatives is "a
matter of practical convenience or political expediency rather than of constitutional
law." "If the procedure of treaty regulation proves ineffective in a particular case
because of the constitutional impediment relative to ratification," writes Professor
Garner, "there is no reason of constitutional or international law why recourse to
the easier alternative of legislative action cannot be had, if the President and a
.
6
EDwARD S. CORWIN, THE CONsTTUT-ON AND WORLDe ORGANIZATION 23 (1944); Riescnfeld, supra
note 2o9, at 674-675.
"
3 7 it should be noted that congressional-executive agreements are effective as the "law of the land"
and have the same overriding effects as treaties in respect to state law. This is true even of Presidential
agreements. For distinguished authority see United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937); United
States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942). Justice Sutherland for the Court declared in the earlier case:
"Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard
to state laws or policies. The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has been recognized from
the beginning ... In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect
of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of
New York does not exist. Within the field of its powers, whatever the United States right-
fully undertakes, it necessarily has warrant to consummate. And when judicial authority
is invoked in aid of such consummation, state constitutions, state laws, and state policies
are irrelevant to the inquiry and decision. It is inconceivable that any of them can be
interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional power."
Id. at 33X-32. This language is quoted with approval by Justice Douglas in the Pink case, supra, at 223.
For succinct summary of this point see United States v. Pink-A Re-appraisal, 48 COL. L. REv. 890, 896-7
(1948).
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majority of the two Houses of Congress so desire, as has been done with success on
various occasions in the past."'238
To establish that federal power over foreign affairs, whether exercised by treaty
or congressional-executive agreement, is ample to implement an effective covenant
on human rights, it is not necessary to establish, a~s the bar leaders demand, that this
power is limitless. So long as the Supreme Court sits, honors the Fifth Amend-
ment, and is able to make its decrees effective, the tyranny they fear is illusory. The
safeguards of the Fifth Amendment and the other Bill-of-Rights provisions, stand
unquestionably in the way of abuse of power over foreign affairs. While it is true
that there has never been a square holding that the Fifth Amendment, or other
prohibitions of the Constitution, are applicable to the substantive provisions of a
treaty,29 the dicta are relentlessly consistent,2  and the consensus of opinion" un-
flagging, in affirming this proposition. "Resting upon the fundamental grounds
that it [the Fifth Amendment] does," comments Professor Corwin, "it may be
confidently claimed as establishing the limits, not merely of congressional power,
but of the treaty-power as well, whenever it impinges upon private rights." It is
this restriction which unquestionably gives substance to the constantly reiterated
prohibition against treaties authorizing "what the Constitution forbids."243 What
applies to treaties is equally applicable to congressional-executive agreements ? 4
There is nothing in either the decision or opinion in the recent, much-mooted case
2"8 Garner, Atcts and Joint Resolutions of Congress as Substitutes for Treaties, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 482,
488 (1935).
The special problems that would be involved in our adherence to an International Court of Human
Rights can be resolved when, and if, the occasion arises. There is considerable opinion that such a
court would not offer the best technical means of implementation. H. LAuTERPAcTrr, HumAN RIGHTs,
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1945); and
PRELMINARY REPORT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AssoCIATIoN, BRUSSELS CONFERENCE (1948). If, however,
such a court should be decided upon, the constitutional difficulties do not appear insuperable. See
Wright, Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of Powers in the United States, x2 Am. J. INT'L L.
64, 85-90 (19x8); Comment, 58 YALE L. J. 1142, 1155 (X949).
2" HENRY RorrscHAEsER, HANDBOOK OF AMECAN CONsTnruOTONAL LAW 385 (1939); WEINFIELD,
op. cit. supra note x66, at 31.
"' Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267 (1890):
"It would not be contended that it [the treaty-power] extends so far as to authorize what the Consti-
tution forbids . . ."
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 341 (1924):
" .. it [the treaty-power] does not extend so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids . .
See also Cherokee Tobacco v. United States, xi Wall. 6x6 (U. S. 1870); Browne v. Duchesne, 19 How.
x83, X97 (U. S. 1856); Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 656 (U. S. 1853); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S.
244, 370 (x9ox). But cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796). On this point the case is probably
dubious law today. See WIL.LAR B. CowLas, TREATIES AND CONSTTuTnONAL LAW: PROPERTY INTER-
FERENCES AND DOE PROCESS OF LAW (941), a definitive work which reviews all the cases and literature
and thoroughly establishes the conclusions expressed in our text.
2 2 BtrrLEa, op. cit. supra note x66, Section 442; CowLEs, op. cit. supra note 240; 1 WILLOUGHBY,
op. cit. supra note 166, Sec. 219; WEINFELD, Labor Treaties and the Due Process Clause, 6 BROOK. L, REv.
338 (937).
142 CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY, op. cit. supra note 166, at 17.
"- See note 240 supra.
"See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 143 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936).
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of United States v. Pink... to support a contrary conclusion. The ground for the
decision in that case, which concerned the effect of an executive agreement between
President Roosevelt and Litvinov, assigning the New York assets of a Russian in-
surance company to the United States, was that under the facts-all American
creditors of the insurance company having been satisfied prior to suit by the United
States-the Federal Government could in the interest of protecting general creditors
of Russia in the United States be permitted to give itself priority over foreign credi-
tors without doing violence to the Fifth Amendment. The opinion of the Court,
by Justice Douglas, clearly assumed that the Fifth Amendment was applicable ("To
be sure, aliens as well as citizens are entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment"), but urged that the Federal Government was no more barred by the terms
of that Amendment from securing priority for itself and its nationals over foreign'
creditors than states were precluded from similar preference under the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 ' Despite the sad plight of foreign creditors of expropriated Russian
corporations, there is no doubt that the great protections of the Constitution remain
for residents of the United States, citizen and alien.
Legislation implementing treaties has, moreover, been categorically declared sub-
ject to the Fifth Amendment. It is ironic that a decision upholding slavery needs
be invoked to support a program for human rights. Nonetheless, in the Dred
Scott247 case the issue was the constitutionality of the "Missouri Compromise," an
act which pursuant to Article III of the Treaty of Cession of Louisiana" 8 abolished
slavery (Missouri excepted) in the Louisiana Purchase area. In striking down this
act Chief Justice Taney held that the taking of property in slaves without just com-
pensation was a violation of the Fifth Amendment. It is not to be expected that
the Court would today do less in the cause of freedom.
The final constitutional charge of the bar leaders that the United States is
peculiarly vulnerable in international undertakings about human rights, because,
unlike in many countries, its treaties if intended to be self-executing, are self-exe-
cuting as laws of the land,4' is inconsequential. Even assuming that there is any
danger in reaffirmation through international agreement of our respect for funda-
245315 U. S. 203 (1942).
2
. Id. at 228; see Comment, supra note 237, at 897-899.
2'Scott v. Sanford, ig How. 393, 446-454 (U. S. 1857).
248 See CowLEs, op. cit. supra note 240, at 159-176.
245 Briggs, in THE LAw OF NATIONS: CAsEs, DOCUMENTS, AN NoTEs 432 (1938), cites a surprising
number of countries as in accord with the United States. He writes:
"In many states the constitution or constitutional practice stipulates that international law-or at least
treaties-are the law of the land. This is the practice of the United States, Switzerland, France and
Belgium (with qualifications), Holland, Spain, Germany (Art. 4 of the Constitution of igig), Austria,
Estonia, Egypt, Argentina, many South American States, and possibly others."
The British practice which requires an act of the executive plus approval of Parliament to make an
agreement the law of the land, if it brings any changes, is in fact not too different from United States
practice which requires an act of the executive plus, for agreements beyond the scope of the President's
own power, the approval of the Senate or of the whole Congress. See FRANcs 0. WILCOx, THE B TIFv-
CATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 78 (1935).
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mental human rights, several remedies are ready to hand. The agreement can by its
terms be made effective internally in this country only when other states similarly
implement it; or reservation in such terms can be attached to our ratification; or
assuming we accept immediate obligation and bad faith develops in other countries,
the Congress can promptly abrogate any internal obligation. In the case of bad faith
by other countries, well-hallowed doctrines of international law, such as rebus sic
stantibus ° and abrogation for failure of performance, are available to discharge even
any international obligation we may have assumed.
VI
From the perspective of centuries necessary to realistic appraisal of the United.
Nations human rights program, it is obvious not only that it is not impolitic for the
United States to participate in that program but that it would be most impolitic
for the United States to fail to assume the leadership that world events have
thrust upon it. The human rights program is but an integral and indispensable part
of a total program designed to preserve peace and to maintain a free society for as
many as possible of the peoples of the world-a program supported by the whole
free world and today the principal concern of our national policy and national
effort.-61 So far from being a product or hallmark of totalitarianism or statism of
any kind, human rights guarantees, even when supplemented by concern for that
-t 0See Bvios, op. cit. supra note 249, at 477 et seq. with citations. For the practice, legality, and
technique of reservations, see WILCOX, op. cit. supra note 249, at 47; 5 GREN H. HAcKworHT, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw ioi (1943); HARvARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, LAW OF TREk T 843
(1935); DAVID H. MILLER, RESERVATIONS IN TREATIES (ii9).
2" It is significant that the Russian response to the human rights program has been marked by
caution only comparable to that of the American bar leaders. The Declaration was found "acceptable"
on the whole, but also "unsatisfactory" because among other reasons it contained no machinery for
enforcement. See U. N. Document E/8oo, 1948, pP. 29, 30. Yet the consistent Russian position during
the 1949 Session of the Human Rights Commission was that no enforcement of Human Rights on the
international level could be tolerated. In supporting this rigid and legalistic conception of "sovereignty,"
Mr. Pavlov has insisted before the Commission that Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter would be
violated if any other course were taken. See U. N. Documents E/CN4 /sis, io June, 1949; id.IXI 4 , i6
June 1949. See also Soviet Statement on Implementation Members, E/CN4/15 4 , 24 June 1948, in which
all the draft proposals submitted for implementation of human rights were rejected. In a vein all too
familiar, the Soviet objection reads:
"... It [the Soviet Delegation] notes that all these drafts and proposals interpret imple-
mentation to mean not a system of measures for ensuring that human rights are implemented
and guaranteed in every country by the State and society, but rather, a system of inter-
national methods of pressure to be exercised through special organs established for this
purpose (e.g. an international court, international committee or a United Nations public
prosecutor, etc.), and intended to force individual States to take particular steps connected
with execution of the Convention on Human Rights.
"It is clear, therefore, that such 'implementation' may become a means of interfering in
the internal affairs of a State party to the Convention, and of undermining the sovereignty
and independence of particular States .. "
For earlier Soviet views and analysis of Soviet law see Hazard, The Soviet Union and a World Bill of
Rights, 47 Cot L. R)v. 1095 (x947).
It is not to be expected that the Soviets will subscribe to many of the political rights regarded by
the West as indispensable to freedom. To the extent, however, that they will agree to an authoritative
formulation of rights that free peoples cherish, there is so much gain. To the extent that they refuse to
agree, the lines between the objectives of the Soviets and other peoples are only more clearly drawn.
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economic opportunity without which no rights can be secure, 2 are a product.of
our own liberal revolution and are indispensable to a free society. The basic element
in any human rights guarantee is the presumption of private choice and the in-
sistence that, in so far as is compatible with the best interests of the community as a
whole, private choice be protected against coercion of any kind, from any possible
source, governmental or otherwise. It is this emphasis upon private choice in all
aspects of life which distinguishes a free society from totalitarianisms which rely
and depend upon dictation, coercion, and violence. The. greatest single issue before
the world today is whether a society which emphasizes private choice as opposed to
external dictation can survive. In an unorganized world faced with possible annihi-
lation, it is a grave question whether the centuries-long trend from a coercive, caste,
and immobile society toward a more and more perfecdy realized democracy can be
continued, or must give way to precipitous descent into the closed society of garrison-
prison states, dominated by a new caste specializing in violence.
It should need no emphasis that one condition of the survival of a free society is a
vision, fortified with reasonable hopes of fulfillment, by the peoples of the world
of what a free society can offer. Loyalties that are not indissolubly tied to democracy
can be captured by totalitarianism. It is not suggested that a human rights program
alone can embody all the conditions necessary to preserve peace and a free society in
the contemporary world. The total conditions of peace and a free society must in-
clude the creation of institutions and a production and distribution of values ade-
quate to take account of all the world-wide interdependences described above. a
In terms of institutions, this means a sufficient organization of world-wide com-
munity coercion to maintain freedom from violence and aggression and to "pro-
vide a framework of policy and regulation which will permit the peoples of
the world to pursue all their values by peaceful procedures."" In terms of values,
it means both a certain concentration and certain dispersal of power and "a certain
balance of income and wealth, a lack of discrimination for reasons irrelevant to
capacity under respect, a flow of realistic information under enlightenment, less
destructive personality formation under character, a growing common standard of
right under rectitude," and so on.- 5 The indispensable function among these con-
ditions of a human rights program, with its enshrinement of the "deep historic ex-
... That human rights are incomplete without opportunity for economic freedom is now axiomatic.
Thus Becker, in developing the principal theme of a brilliant book, MODERN DEatocPitec (1941) writes
(at p. 62):
"What the average man now needs is the opportunity to acquire by his own effort in
an occupation for which he is fitted, the economic security which is essential to decent and
independent living."
More famous is Anatole France's reference to "the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and
poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." Quoted in CHARLES
E. MERR.IAu , SYsrEsxrx PoLuTIcs 55 (1945). For excellent expositions, see TAWNEY, EQuALITY (5931),
and the essays by Woodward and Carr in UNIVERsrr OF DENVER, FOUNDATIONS FOR WORLD ORDER
(1949).
2"'For development see McDougal, The Role of Law in World Politics, 20 Miss. L. J. 254 (1949).
"' Id. at 277. ...Id. at 278.
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perience" and "moral sense of mankind" '256 into world constitutional doctrine, should
be clear. Its function is to clarify the values of the people of the world in terms
of the values of a free society, to reinforce their expectations that they can best maxi-
mize their own personal values in such society, to cement their loyalties to such
society, to promote that consensus with respect to democratic values which will
reduce to the minimum the need to use coercion to compel lawless dissenters, to
further the increasing identifications of free peoples wit all other free peoples, and
in general to predispose the peoples of the world to the creation of the institutions
necessary to survival in this atomic era.257 To recapitulate in detail the promise of
such a program in terms of all of man's basic values-in providing the access to
political power upon which freedom and peace depend, in promoting the flow of
enlightenment necessary to sustain democratic processes, in establishing the equality
necessary for recognition of common merit as a human being and special merit as
an individual, and so on-is certainly here superfluous.5 8
To most men of good will it is obvious that the United States has peculiar
responsibilities of leadership in the human rights program, not only in aid of its
own survival but, because of its paramount power position among free peoples, also
in aid of the survival of all such peoples. It is common knowledge that since World
War II the United States has been singularly inept in formulating a comprehensive
and positive moral doctrine behind which the free people of the world can unite.
In Persuade or Perish, a book too little read, a distinguished writer convincingly
"- H. LAuTERPAcHT, PRELImINARY REPORT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AsSOcIATIoN, BRusSELS CON.ER-
ENCE 27 (948) (Memo U. N. Document E/CN4 /89, 1948).
" For itemization of some of the beneficent effects of earlier human rights declarations, see
TAWNEY, EQUALITY 134 et seq. (1931).
A leap from the premise that since some treaties have been regarded as mere "scraps of paper" to
the conclusion that any principle, enshrined in great state papers or constitutional documents, must be
futile and without effects on the world power process, involves a very considerable underestimation of
the role that authoritatively formulated principle can be made to play in the affairs of men.
A similar fallacy underlies the repeated suggestion that human rights stem from some source higher
than government and that not only can government do little to secure them but also any effort by
government to secure them is likely to endanger them. To recognize that devotion to human rights
has many justifications-religious, natural law, and other-rooted deep in man's nature, it is not
necessary to ignore that such rights often get scant protection in fact if they do not have government
or centralized community coercion behind them. One wonders whether the opponents of the United
Nations program regard the Bill-of-Rights provisions in our own Constitution as superfluous and why,
in contradiction of their premises, they shudder for the fate of any rights that may be omitted from
the United Nations program. Men have always sought to secure their rights by that formulation of
principle and balancing of power which we call government; the alternative to government is anarchy
and rule by private violence. To fail to distinguish the moral justifications for rights from the realities
of the power necessary to protect them is simple, and perhaps suicidal, intellectual confusion.
... It will be observed that the case we make is not so much for the latest draft of the proposed
Covenant on Human Rights, though we think it good so far as it goes, as for the kind of Covenant
that the United States should establish as its goal. It is our judgment after detailed analysis, recital
of which is not necessary to our present purposes, of both the Genocide Convention and the draft
Covenant on Human Rights, that they in no way-change, but rather re-enunciate, standards which we
have professed in this country since the Civil War. Hence any criticism we might make of the con-
tent of the proposed agreements would be, not for their inclusions, but for their omissions-for their
failure to incorporate, and perhaps even to raise, more of the standards which we and other free
peoples profess to honor and to regard as necessary for survival.
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urges that "it is hardly an exaggeration that we must persuade or perish,' 'a that we
must produce a positive, world-encompassing faith or find ourselves isolated even
from other free peoples. The human rights program offers us an opportunity, un-
paralleled in its potentialities, to assume and give concreteness to the moral leader-
ship incumbent upon us.200
So much misconception is abroad, it may bear emphasis that participation by the
United States in this United Nations program for securing human rights imports
no revolutionary changes in our form of government, increases no dangers of
federal absolutism, and shifts no real power from the states to the Federal Govern-
ment that the course of events has not already shifted 1 The truth is that the social
and economic, and hence constitutional, structure of the United States has had ne
immunity from the forces that have made for interdependence in the world at large.
The same forces that operate to make the world one, operate even more intensely
to make this nation one, not only as to foreign affairs and domestic economy, but
as to all values: the degree of democracy in participation in power processes; the
sanctity, freedom from arbitrary restraint, and well-being of the individual human
being; the free flow of enlightenment; and so on. For several decades this national
unity and interdependence in fact have found expression at an accelerating tempo in
our formal constitutional doctrine. Concomitant with the expansion of federal
power through interpretation of the commerce and other clauses,202 has come a
striking increase of federal supervision over civil rights and liberties.2 More and
V WALLACE CARROL, PERSUADE OR PERISH 389 (1948).
... The fear, so dramatically emphasized by the bar leaders, that the United States might by entering
into new agreements expose itself to a losing battle of mutual recriminations with the Russians is idlc.
Our practices are not so vulnerable as such fear implies; such a battle is possible under the present
United Nations Charter and is going on; and there is no reason to assume that our own diplomats
would be disadvantaged by having a new set of premises, assuming that the Russians subscribe, for
inquiring into some of the obscurities of Ruhssian practice. The newspapers have indeed been filled
recently with stories about some questions of slave labor and of violations of human rights in Russian
satellite countries. More positively we have, as indicated above, in the symbols of freedom, democracy,
and equality instruments of potentially tremendous power for capturing and holding the loyalties of
peoples; to leave these symbols to the exploitation of others, who in fact make a mockery of them
by denying access to the very values that make them meaningful, can only be folly. Our national
concern must be, not so much for Russian criticism, as for what the rest of the world really, and should
deservedly, think of us. In the words of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, To SEcuRr THEsE
RIGrrS 148 (1947): "The United States is not so strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal is
not so inevitable that we can ignore what the world thinks of us or our record."
" "The advdnce of federal power, however much we may regret," one writer observes, "seems to
have been in the main as inevitable as the advance of science which produced it." Green, The Supreme
Court, the Bill of Rights and the States, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV. 6o8, 615 (1949).
'2 See Green, supra note 261, at 614-6x5; Fellman, Recent Tendencies in Civil Liberties, Decisions
of the Supreme Court, 34 CORN. L. Q. 331, 332 (1949).
"'For notable articles among many on this subject, see Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public
Interest, 52 YALE L. J. i (942); Berger, The Supreme Court and Group Discrimination Since 1937,
49 COL. L. REv. 2O (949); Green, supra note 261; Green, The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amend.
ment and the Supreme Court, 46 MicH. L. REv. 869 (948); Fellman, supra note 262; Bosky and Picker-
ing, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U. oF Ci. L. REv. 266 (x946); Comment, The
Adamson Case: A Study in Constitutional Technique, 56 YALE L. J. 268 (1949). See also for more
general surveys of the problem: MILTON R. KONVI-z, THE CONSTIrUTION AND CIvIL RbGHTS (1947);
ROBERT K. CAtR, FEDaRAL PROTECTION oF CIVIL RIcsS: QUEsT FOR A SWORD (1947); and Fraenkcl,
The Federal Civil Rights Law, 31 MINN. L. Rev. 301 (947).
THE RIGHTS OF MAN IN m WORLD COMMUNITY 533
more the Supreme Court has conceived and established itself, under a great variety
of constitutional provisions, as a unifying and norm-setting agency for the entire
nation2 4 The national interest that this development continue, with legislative
support, has been demonstrated by many observers and is the official platform of
both major political parties.205 The same considerations that make human rights
of world-wide concern as among nations apply, with all the added intensity of the
forces operating for national interdependence, to make such rights of nation-wide
concern for our people.
To dispel fears of novelty in the human rights program, the trend in decision
by the Supreme Court to establish national standards may be indicated in detail.
The chief vehicle for development has been the Fourteenth Amendment, expanded
both in its application to parties and in the scope of rights protected. The criterion
of what constitutes "state" action in the application of this Amendment has been
progressively broadened, culminating in decisions finding "state" action in un-
authorized acts of state officials,260 in determinations of political parties,N7 in ex-
clusions from company towns, and in the enforcement of restrictive covenants by
state courts2 9 The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied against the
states has been widened notably also through incorporation, beginning in 1927, of all
the political activity freedoms of the First Amendment (freedom of speech, press,
assembly) as well as freedom of religion and freedom to petition Congress for
redress of grievances. 70 Moreover, the area of freedoms outside the First Amend-
"' An illuminating discussion of this process is to be found in Lusky, supra note 263, especially
at 13-21. See also Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 5o YALE L. J.
1319, 1349 ('94').
" Republican Party Platform, June 22, 1948; Democratic Party Platform, July 14, 1948.
Among the better statements of the national interest are Lusky, supra note 263; Tom C. CLAMR AND
PILIP B. PE, -rLMN, PREJTUDICE AND PROPERTY (1948), the brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); REPORT OF THlE PRESIDENT'S ComT-rEE ON CiVL RiGHrs,
To SECURE THEsE RiGrTs (1947). For some reflection of the prevailing public concern for these
questions, see the extensive list of organizations which filed briefs Amicus Curiae in the Shelley case,
supra; Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16
U. OF Cm. L. REV. 203, 205 n. 6 (1949).
Lusky, supra note 263 at 18-19, after detailed consideration of many aspects of national interest
summarizes:
"The justification for Federal intervention in the field is therefore clear. There is a national interest
not only in preserving a form of government in which men can control their own destinies, but in
enabling the common man to see its advantages and know its (easibility. It is an interest in quelling
doubts as to the practical efficacy of our system to accomplish essential justice. It is an interest in pre-
venting deviations from our national ideal, even in local government, because deviations create such
doubts. In short, it is an interest in making a belief in our system a part of the American creed."
..0 Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945). See KoNVITz, op. cit. supra note 263, at 49-90;
CAu, op. cit. supra note 263, at 112-114.
... Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (944); Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E. D. S. C. 1947),
aff'd x65 F. 2d, 387 (C. C. A. 4 th 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 875 (1948). For a comprehensive
treatment of "state" action see Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against
Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 Ltw. GuiL REv. 627 (946).
... Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946).
... Shelley v. Kraemer and McGee v. Sipes, 334 U. S. 1 (1948). See Ming, Racial Restrictions and
the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. oF Cm. L. REV. 203 (1949).
""0Free Speech and Press: Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1924) (dictum); Fiske
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ment and not yet enforceable against the states is visibly contracting. Indication of
the trend is the continuing debate launched in the Adamson271 case concerning the
"incorporation" in toto of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Justice Black, joined by three other Justices, 272 wrote a chal-
lenging dissent in that case and demonstrated with a compelling array of facts the
unmistakable intention of the sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment to make the
Bill of Rights applicable through it to the states.2 73  The majority, on the other
hand, felt impelled to favor the "fair trial" rule which in effect confines strict pro-
tection of the privilege against self-incrimination (or any other appropriate safe-
guard of the Bill of Rights), through "incorporation" into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Fifth or other corresponding Bill-of-Rights Amendments, to those cases
in which failure to enforce a Bill-of-Rights prohibition "would be lacking in funda-
mental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice. 27 4  Nevertheless, the in-
corporation rule was again advanced in a concurring opinion by Justice Rutledge in
In re Oliuer,i 2 75 a case holding Michigan's one man jury system responsible for viola-
tion of the requirement of a public trial21  While the "fair trial" rule is never an
absolute bar to a selective incorporation-case by case-or independent determina-
tion of the rights of the suspect, accused and convicted, 71 it nevertheless obscures the
extent to and certainty with which Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment
v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927) (square holding). Assembly: De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353
(1937); see also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937); Hague v. C10, 307 U. S. 496 (1939). Re-
ligion: Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); but see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158
(1944) (for adults only). Prohibition against establishment of religion: Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board
of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); compare Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
Petition of government for redress of grievances: Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941). See Green,
supra note 261 passim.
" Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947). See Comment, supra note 263.
""5Justice Douglas concurred in Justice Black's opinion, while Justice Murphy, joined by Justice
Rutledge, wrote a separate dissent in which he approved Black's position excepting only the novel limi-
tation that the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited by the Bill of Rights. Id. at 124.
"" Id. at 68 and 92 et seq.
The original view was well expressed by Justice Harlan's famous dissent in the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U. S. 3, 26 (1883): "I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent
amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism ...
Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through
national legislation, if need be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American
citizenship, have been so construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish ...which
they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their fundamental law." Cf. Watt and Orlikoff,
The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 ILL. L. Rlv. 13 (1949).
"'Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 462 (1942). The "fair trial" rule was first introduced in this
case, which involved denial of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
175 333 U. S. 257 (1948).
"e conflict in the Court between the incorporation rule and the fair trial rule continues unabated.
See the dissents similar to those in the Adamson case in Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134 (1947); Gayes
v. New York, 332 U. S. 145 (x947); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640 (948). And the more recent, Gibbs
v. Burke, 69 Sup. Ct. 1247 (1949), in which justices Black and Douglas concur in the finding that a fair
trial had been denied in an issue involving the right to counsel, but explicitly state that they "think Betts
v. Brady should be overruled." Id. at 1251.
27See e.g., Uveges v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 69 Sup. Ct. 184 (i949) (failure to pro-
vide counsel for 17 year old boy held denial of due process).
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protections are specifically applicable to the states"' But even this confusion does
not interrupt the general trend toward federal supervision. Notice of accusation
and an impartial tribunal are conceded an essential part of due process,2 70 and
federal prohibition against coerced confessions in state courts has been recognized
since Brown v. Mississippi in I9360 ° Other decisions on the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment, not involving the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, show simi-
lar trends. In recent terms, equal protection has been widened by decisions invali-
dating discriminatory presumptions in state alien land laws,2 " and prohibitions
against issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible to citizenship;. 2
and by a narrowing of the equal but separate facilities rule through the requirement
that educational facilities be furnished as promptly for Negroes as for other groups
283
The range of topics included within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment as
amplified by the First Amendment enlarges continuously also. Freedom of speech
and press includes freedom from postal censorship,28 4 peaceful picketing,2 5 and,
more recently, freedom to use loud-speakers in public streets,2 6 and to publish
despite an indefinite prohibitory statute "stories of bloodshed, lust or crime."
2 s
To these growing national standards, may be added the fact that in determining the
constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme Court no longer abides by the traditional
presumption in favor of the statute where civil rights are concerned s thus per-
ceptibly increasing federal supervision. The commerce clause too has been a means
to national standards. Two notable cases are Edwards v. California"' and Morgan
v. Virginia, 0° where it was held that interstate commerce was burdened by state
laws forbidding transportation of indigent persons into the state of California, in the
first case, and segregating Negroes in busses traveling in interstate commerce, in the
second. From this review, it is apparent that any shift in formal authority from
*'" On searches and seizures, see Wolf v. Colorado, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 1364 (949) (Fourteenth
Amendment does not absorb this Fourth Amendment protection). The direct application of the double
jeopardy prohibition to states was assumed but not decided in Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459
(947), a capital case, in which a second electrocution was held not to be double jeopardy nor to
infringe the prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishments.
2"See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 389-390 (1898); Cole v. Kansas, 333 U. S. 196 (948).
See Green, supra note 26i, at 637. For confrontation of witnesses, see Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U. S. 97, 131 (1934).
280 297 U. S. 278 (936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (940); but see Lisenba v. California,
314 U. S. 219 (I94i). In the past term of the Court see Watts v. Indiana, 69 Sup. Ct. x347 (x949);
Turner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 69 Sup. Ct. 1352 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 69 Sup.
Ct. 1354 (1949).
2 Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (948).
"a Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410 (1948).
... Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (948).
"' Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U. S. 146 (1946).
2.'Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). But see Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
69 Sup. Ct. 684 (1949).
,
8 Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948); but see Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 Sup. Ct. 448 (1949).
217 Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (948).
... See Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U. S. 244, 252, n. 4 (r938). See
also Fellman, supra note 262, at 348.
50s3r4 U. S. i6o (94). 290 328 U. S. 323 (1946).
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the states to the Federal Government that might occur by our joining in an inter-
national covenant to secure human rights could only anticipate a development al-
ready rapidly going forward under other powers, a development which promises a
comprehensive structure of constitutional doctrine, national in its application and
adequate to secure the national interest.
It may, in conclusion, be emphasized that the bar leaders' recommendation of
the slow approach to human rights, that it is better to await the evolutionary pro-
cesses of customary law and not to use agreement, that international law cannot be
made in the "twinkling of an eye," misconceives every factor upon which such
recommendation is based: miscoiceives the intimate interdependences, if not
identity, of human rights and security, the world-wide interdependences of peoples
everywhere; misconceives our obligations under the United Nations Charter, the
potentialities of new agreement, and even the reach of traditional, customary* inter-
national law, with its fundamental and continuous concern for the welfare of the
individual human being; misconceives both the scope of federal power under our
Constitution over matters of international concern and the safeguards imposed by
the Constitution on the exercise of such power; and, finally, misconceives the in-
dispensability of human rights protection to a free society and the degree to which
this nation is becoming, and must be, "one" for human rights as for other values.
To go slow upon any measure which promises to enhance security, whether con-
ceived as freedom from simple physical violence or as a broader freedom to pursue
all values by democratic procedures, may in the contemporary world context be to
invite destruction. A human rights program alone cannot preclude atomic or
bacteriological catastrophe, but such a program can bring compellingly to the focus
of world attention the needs and aspirations of mankind in terms of human dignity
and may, by cementing loyalties to free society, be able to mobilize such aspirations
in aid of security rather than destruction. The people of the United States, with
their existing high standards for the protection of human rights, can have nothing
whatsoever to lose by a program designed to raise standards everywhere. "The argu-
ment that the time is not ripe for extending the rule of law in relation to this or
that proposal," an English writer urges apropos human rights, "appears to me un-
sound. Time is a forelock and, after great wars and great upheavals, that forelock
hangs out like a bell-rope and needs to be pulled."2'' It can be rational only for the
United States acting promptly and effectively after its great traditions to assert
leadership in giving time's forelock a world-resounding ring.
2
' V. Harvey Moore in discussion of International Law and Rights of the Individual, 3! Tn.
oF GRor. Soc. io6 (1945).
